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INTRODUCTION

T

HIS Article proposes a framework for resolving disputes that
arise as a result of denial of access to electronic networks, or
from the transmission of defamatory messages over such networks. It is part of a symposium held at Villanova Law School on
November 7, 1992.1
One of the main conclusions of the symposium discussion
was that the law has only a limited role to play. 2 The best guarantee of the free flow of ideas and information is decentralized
power in individual private network service suppliers to define
and adapt the terms of their service. Moreover, in a "free market" consumers exercise power by electing one provider or another according to their wishes and differences in the types of
service available.
Although the symposium participants agreed that the law has
a limited role to play, this does not mean that the law has no role
to play. In order for private choice to be meaningful, for the market dynamics to work, the law must enforce the bargains struck.
Consequently, contract law must meet the realities of electronic
networks. These changing realities require that the theories and
principles of relational contract, contract formation, contract
modification and contract interpretation adapt and expand. This
Article considers this role for law.
There is a related role for the law discussed at the symposium, but it is beyond the scope of this Article. Because there will
always be a possibility of bottlenecks in which the consumer or
supplier wishing access has no realistic alternatives, 3 the law must
1. This Article builds upon equal access and third party liability concepts
developed in an earlier article by the author: Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability,
the FirstAmendment, and Equal Access to Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 65
(Spring 1992).
2. The symposium featured a panel discussion of a hypothetical fact pattern. For a summary of the discussion, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Introduction, 38
VILL. L. REV. 319 (1993).

3. Under antitrust law, such a "bottleneck" may be determined to be an
"essential facility." In addressing a monopolization offense under § 2 of the
Sherman Act, one court has stated: "Any company which controls an 'essential
facility' or a 'strategic bottleneck' in the market violates the antitrust laws if it
fails to make access to that facility available to its competitors on fair and reasonable terms .... " United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 524 F. Supp. 1336,
1352-53 (D. D.C. 1981), quoted in Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of

Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395 (1986).
In the network context, the term "bottleneck" describes control of an essential communication medium by a supplier. For example, for most small computer and modem users, the local telephone system represents a bottleneck
through which all data communication must pass on its way to a multiplicity of
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impose duties on the supplier with bottleneck power to provide
access on reasonably equal terms. Mr. Stevens' article addresses
4
this question.
This Article begins where the symposium discussion left off
with respect to enforcement of obligations in a reasonably free
and competitive marketplace. It begins by explaining how decentralized decisionmaking, long characteristic of electronic communication, may not be viable as internetworking technologies come
into wide use. Then, this Article briefly identifies the types of disputes that may arise in future network environments and discusses the kinds of institutional arrangements that can make and
enforce rules for dealing with such disputes, while observing that
contract law is the most appropriate legal doctrine for defining
the interrelationship between the network institutions and the
law. Relational contract offers ways of relaxing the rigors of traditional contract and of harmonizing them with the realities of
networked communities. The Article then proceeds to evaluate
specific contract doctrines to determine the prerequisites to formation of contract duties, and to specify how those duties are
modified and interpreted, noting that the issues in the network
environment are remarkably similar to issues in employment law.
The Article also discusses the difficulty with using contract law to
give effect to apparent duties of network intermediaries who do
not have "privity of contract" with originators and consumers of
traffic on the network.
The Article then looks more particularly at the two modes of
dispute resolution, rulemaking and adjudication, and considers
how they might work practically in networked environments, making use of the contract doctrines and of the technology configurations the first half of the Article develops.
Finally, the Article evaluates how liability for harm to third
persons can be controlled through contract principles enforced
through alternative dispute resolution. The Article then proposes statutory language that would create a limited immunity for
providers of network services against liability to third parties, but
only if they publish their terms of service in a central electronic
bulletin board and adhere to those terms of service.
wide area digital networks, including Tymnet, Sprintnet, Westnet, Meadnet,
CompuServe, AT&T and MCI.
4. See John M. Stevens, The Sherman Act and the NREN, 38 VILL. L. REV. 571
(1993).
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DECENTRALIZED DECISIONMAKING IN INTERNETWORKS

In network communities, rule setting and rule enforcement 5
are highly decentralized. Typically, the rules are made and enforced at the local area network (LAN) or "campus network"
level. The university or the corporation setting up the LAN or
cluster of LANs is both the legislator and the enforcer.
Decentralized rulemaking and enforcement are not problematic as long as the individual network communities are electronically isolated from each other. But as the communities begin to
interconnect, for example, as part of the Internet, interdependence increases and the boundaries between LANs blur. Interdependence and inconsistent rules combine to create a problem. 6
Technology has increased network interdependence and at
the same time made it more difficult to enforce rules because the
network boundaries are not distinct now. Current Internet technology uses dynamic routing. 7 This means that the path taken by
any particular message is unpredictable. Thus, the sender is obligated to comply with the rules of intermediate nodes the identity
of which the sender does not know and cannot know." This
presents voluntary compliance problems. Similarly, dynamic
routing puts the intermediate nodes in the position of handling
traffic from persons they do not and cannot know. This presents
enforcement problems.
The interdependence and fuzzy boundaries spawn problems
like those arising under the Articles of Confederation after the
5. Dispute resolution in any context involves consideration of both rule setting (rulemaking) and rule enforcement.
6. The Internet architecture, like many other nonproprietary wide-area networks, relies upon many intermediate networks to transfer messages between
the origin and destination. For example, a message originating at Villanova University, addressed to a computer at Harvard University, would transit computers
at Drexel University, Princeton University and MIT before it arrived at Harvard.
7. Dynamic routing means that the path that a particular message takesand sometimes different parts of the same message-is not predetermined.
Rather, at the time the computer establishes the path for a particular message it
simultaneously determines what path would be most efficient.
8. The near anonymity of originator and of intermediate handler is not limited to the Internet. A rapidly growing phenomenon among private dial-up
electronic bulletin board operators is the automatic sharing of the contents of
certain conferences and Usenet news groups. The bulletin boards automatically
dial each other and exchange files falling within certain categories. This happens entirely without human intervention. To a considerable extent, a bulletin
board participating in this automatic interconnection relays traffic the bulletin
board operator never sees. Indeed, the only real difference between these interconnected bulletin boards and the Internet is that the bulletin boards are interconnected by the voice telephone system, while the Internet links are purely
digital.
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American Revolution. The individual colonies were feverently independent yet inexorably bound. Inconsistent rules for trade
clogged commerce; long borders and coast lines made enforcing
trade barriers impracticable.
Historically, problems like these tended to be resolved by the
erection of an overarching scheme of governance: the National
Government under the United States Constitution or the European Economic Community. 9 Similarly, as networks become
more and more interdependent, pressure will grow for some kind
of higher level authority to step in and ensure that commerce
flows freely through internetworks. What is not clear is whether
this overarching authority will be a voluntary association, partnership, corporation or cooperative, or whether it simply will be a set
of rules adopted by regular governmental institutions and enforced by agencies and courts.
III.

DISPUTES, RULES

& ENFORCEMENT

METHODS

As networks grow, the following kinds of disputes are almost
certain to arise: (1) someone not yet on the network wants to get
on and one or more of the people already on the network want to
keep him out; (2) someone wants to stop certain kinds of traffic
moving on the network (or to recover damages because the traffic
is moving) and the person moving the traffic wants to continue
moving it; (3) someone on the network believes that someone else
on the network has not lived up to his or her commitments.' 0
Two received legal traditions offer useful frameworks for
handling these types of disputes. The first is the proposition that
certain kinds of promises should be enforced: those that are part
of an exchange and those that reasonably induce detrimental reliance.'I The second is the proposition that governance of private
associations should be accomplished under rules adopted by the
9. See THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-33 (Bertell Oilman &Jonathan
Birnbaum eds., 1990) (containing articles discussing need for national government in light of Shay's Rebellion, defects in Articles of Confederation and need
to compete in world economy).
10. The first type of dispute overlaps with the second type of dispute and
potentially with the third type. Each type of dispute-attempts to join, denial of
access, exclusion of messages-can be based on commitments between the affected parties.
11. See generallyJOHN E. MURRAY,JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 28, at 51 (3d
ed. 1990) (noting six elements to formation of contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (promise reasonably inducing detrimental reliance,
action or forbearance, is enforceable when justice requires).
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private association. 12 The second proposition frequently implicates the first. Both, in effect, are ways of adopting and enforcing
rules of conduct.
In both traditions, three basic models of rulemaking are
useful:
- an authoritarian model, in which a supplier of network
services, like a corporate employer, Compuserve or
3
WESTLAW, sets rules for access and use unilaterally;'
- a democratic model, in which a voluntary association
of network users, bulletin board operators or trade association members set rules through informal social
norms or more formally through multiparty agreements;14 and

- a formal legal model, in which contract offers and acceptances, tort law duties, legislative statutes and administrative agency regulations define acceptable
conduct. ' 5
Making rules is not enough; they must be enforced. Technology makes enforcement more difficult at the same time it in12. The rules of private associations frequently are enforced through contract law. Members of associations make promises to each other when they constitute the association. Associations, as entities, make promises to individual
members. Associations, as entities, make promises to outsiders on how they can
qualify for membership. These promises are analogous to rules.
13. Historically, host-based electronic networks have followed the authoritarian model. Whoever owns the host hardware and software makes the rules.
Commercial information services like CompuServe and WESTLAW have subscriber agreements that are executed before customers are permitted access to
the networks. The terms of these agreements are expressed on preprinted
forms written by the services provider and are supplemented by notices
presented on user screens. Typically, when supplemental terms are presented
on user screens, a user is asked to acknowledge assent to the displayed terms by
typing "Y" or "Yes" and hitting the enter key.
14. Historically, wide area computer networks or internetworks have followed the democratic model. This includes Fido, the network of PC electronic
bulletin board operators, and the Internet.
15. The rulemaking models are interrelated conceptually. As already
pointed out, contract law governs private associations. Unilaterally imposed
rules may be promulgated by providers, but they become enforceable because of
user expectations and acceptance. Similarly, the common law frequently relies
upon voluntary trade standards and general industry practice to interpret contracts and to set standards for conduct under tort law. Finally, legislatures draw
on the common law when drafting statutes.
The rulemaking models are also beginning to overlap as a matter of technology. Authoritarian host-based systems are beginning to interconnect with
internetworks following the democratic model.
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creases pressure for overarching rules.
mechanisms fall into three basic categories:

The enforcement

- social forces in a cohesive community, beginning with
informal disapprobation, and extending ultimately to
expulsion (the "social enforcement model");
- unplugging the offender, either vertically in the case of
a host-based system, or horizontally by denying interconnections to an internetwork (the "disconnection
enforcement model");
- tort, contract, statute and criminal law working
through the regular courts or through a combination
of administrative agencies and courts (the "legal enforcement model").
Rule sources and enforcement mechanisms can be combined in
almost any permutation. As discussed below, however, certain
pairings are more natural than others. The authoritarian
rulemaking model associates well with the disconnection or legal
enforcement model. The democratic rulemaking model associates well with the social enforcement or legal enforcement model.
This Article discusses each of these combinations in turn, and
then moves to explore contract law doctrines as ways of effectuating the major combinations.
A.

The Authoritarian Rulemaking Model

David R. Johnson proposes that network access be governed
according to statements of intention issued by service providers. 16 A service provider would decide unilaterally what kinds of
traffic the provider would handle or exclude and issue an appropriate statement of intention. The expectations of persons desiring access would be shaped by this advance notice. The Johnson
proposal focuses on rulemaking and assumes that enforcement
would occur through some appropriate mechanism.' 7
Such a system has a number of advantages, including all
those usually associated with market control rather than government regulation. But it is unclear whether the terms of the advance notice would be enforceable, and if they are, how would
they be enforced. There are two basic ways through which the
16. See David R. Johnson & Kevin Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications Onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (and Our Contracts)
Be Our Guide?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 487 (1993).
17. Id. at 507-11.
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statement of access terms could be enforceable: through direct
action in a competitive market (the disconnection enforcement
model) and through contract law (the legal enforcement model).
1. Disconnection Enforcement Model
The disconnection enforcement model has the following
components. The supplier of the network service unilaterally issues a statement declaring the terms governing access. The statement primarily emphasizes terms that protect the supplier and so
it reserves the power to cancel or modify the terms and obligates
the supplier to little. Rather, the statement emphasizes the customer's obligations and waives any implied or pre-existing customer rights. The nature of the service to be provided is implied
in the accompanying description of the service.
Without regard to the legal effect of such a unilateral declaration, the supplier is not in fact completely unrestrained when
choosing the contents of such a declaration. Competitive forces
will drive users to suppliers offering better terms. Thus, suppliers
offering better terms will have a larger market share and may be
able to charge a higher price than suppliers offering less favorable
terms. Similarly, a supplier earning the reputation of living up to
his commitments will have a larger market share and be able to
charge higher prices than a supplier with a reputation for reneging on its commitments. These market forces operate entirely independently of the law. 18
If a network user does not follow the rules, the remedy for
the network owner is simple: disconnect the user and take away
his or her password.
This simple remedy hides the fact, already noted, that the
user of network services is not really at the mercy of the rule setter, the supplier. If the user does not like the content of the rules,
if the maker of the rules does not follow them or if the user is
wrongfully disconnected, the user simply switches to another network. In a perfectly competitive market, this is not a problem for
the user. It is as painless as calling one telephone number instead
of another.
Despite the supplier's simple remedy and the equally obvious
user alternatives, the law may have a role to play in protecting the
18. The law does have a role to play, however. Markets are not perfect,
disputes do arise and loss must be allocated when injury occurs. For a discussion
of the role law has to play in this type of dispute resolution, see infra notes 19-24
and accompanying text.
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parties' expectancies. Real markets are imperfect, and there are
potentially significant transaction costs associated with searching
for and changing to an alternative service provider. In a market
environment, these transaction costs may exceed the costs associated with the legal process. This is likely to be the case when a
network user makes a significant investment in network specific
software or hardware, in other words, when there is significant
detrimental reliance on the network's service terms.
On the other hand, there also are transaction costs associated
with the legal process. Depending on the market structure and
the technologies involved, these transaction costs may be greater
than those associated with market reliance. If architectures are
relatively open, and the degree of dependence by a customer on a
particular service provider is otherwise relatively low, market
transaction costs may be low. If the number of service providers
and of customers is high and the regulatory regime is formal, the
transaction costs of legal regulation of the common carrier form
may be high, and the disconnection enforcement model may be
attractive.
2.

Legal Enforcement Model

When the balance of transaction costs militates toward a role
for the law, the second possibility is enforcing the terms of provider notices under contract law. There are several doctrinal difficulties with this approach, but none of them are insuperable.
First, the relationship between the service provider and the network users may or may not satisfy the conditions of a bargained
for exchange. 19 It is contemplated that the service provider unilaterally announces access terms, probably without knowing the
identities of the people who may use the network and certainly
without the give and take that most people associate with bargaining. On the other hand, the bargain theory may be satisfied
by the publication of the advanced notice for the purpose of in19. Justice Holmes described the bargained-for exchange as follows:
No matter what the actual motive may have been, by the express or
implied terms of the supposed contract, the promise and the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at
least in part. It is not enough that the promise induces the detriment or
that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is wanting.
Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903).
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a promise is bargained for if
"it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 71(2) (1981).
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ducing an exchange. It is likely that the motive of a network service provider in publishing the advance notice is to induce people
to pay the provider money to use the network. This is an exchange, at least if the customers pay their money and subscribe
because of the terms of the notice.
A second legal enforcement theory is promissory estoppel.
Under section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,20 the person making a promise may be bound to perform the promise if
someone else reasonably relies on the promise to the second person's detriment. 2' To create an enforceable agreement, the second party's detrimental reliance must have been reasonably
foreseeable.2 2 The user of a network would argue that the terms
of the advance notice are legally enforceable because the user
detrimentally relied on them. However, the user may have difficulty showing detrimental reliance, although passing up other
network subscription opportunities or going to the trouble to arrange telecommunication scripts and distributing information
about EMail addresses based on a particular network may
23
suffice.
A third possibility is more novel, but also has support in the
history of relationships like those involved in electronic networks.
This approach imposes on the supplier common law common carrier obligations based on the holding out represented by the network service provider's advance notice. The holding out theory is
not so much an independent theory for making service provider
notices enforceable as it is a factor reinforcing adaptation of the
24
bargain or promissory estoppel theories.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
21. The elements of the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel are: 1) a
promise reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance (reliance); 2) action or forbearance (reliance) by the promisee; 3) injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. Id. § 90(1) (1981).
22. The promise is one that the "promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee." Id.; see, e.g., Oates v.
Teamster Affiliates Pension, 482 F. Supp. 481, 489 (D.D.C. 1979) (stating that
James Hoffa, Teamsters president, should have reasonably expected leader of
local union to rely on promise of pension coverage).
23. Note that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the plaintiff can
only recover for actions induced by the promise. See, e.g., Stacy v. Merchants
Bank, 482 A.2d 61, 64-65 (Vt. 1984) (in action against bank for breach of promise to lend money, recovery limited to expenses incurred after bank's promise).
In the network context, the user would have to articulate actions or forbearances
induced by the advance notice.
24. There is a considerable body of nineteenth century case law on common-law common carrier obligations; ordinarily, these were not imposed in contract or assumpsit causes of action. See Perritt, supra note 1, at 73-84 (discussing
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The bargain theory, promissory estoppel theory and holding
out concept are developed more fully in later sections of this
25
Article.
B.

The Democratic Rulemaking Model

Private associations with more than a handful of members
function through rules. These rules can be made with varying degrees of formality and enforced socially or legally.
1. Social Enforcement
The democratic rule making model and the social disapproval enforcement mechanism are natural partners. Together
they are more democratic, and more decentralized, which places
them above the alternatives. The problem is that social norms are
enforceable through social disapproval only in special situations,
which are probably becoming less common.
It is widely recognized that informal communities can make
and enforce rules without much assistance from formal law. Yale
Professor Robert C. Ellickson 2 6 is one of the more recent students of this phenomenon. He notes a number of pervasive examples in which the law plays a de minimis role: the development of language, the development of cities and the distribution
of food.2 7 It is possible that informal ground rules for governing
electronic networks would work the same way.
Professor Ellickson and all the other commentators writing
on this subject also recognize, however, that there are important
common law approaches to common carrier duties). It is plausible, however, to
associate the roots of the common-law common carrier obligation with contract
doctrine rather than with other possibilities such as tort, extraordinary writs like
mandamus or pure equity. During this period of the law's evolution, courts were
on the one hand preoccupied with fitting claims into the confines of traditional
common-law writs, but on the other hand, relatively unconcerned with finding a
"cause of action" when equitable jurisdiction was invoked. In other words, people were less preoccupied with the limited jurisdiction of courts, and more willing to allow a judge flexibility to discover an apparent wrong and to formulate a
remedy. Now, the context within which judges are supposed to resolve disputes
is more stylized, but there still is room for innovation in the liability phase as
well as the remedial phase. See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 552
F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983) (entering modified final judgment resulting in breakup of AT&T).
25. For a discussion of the bargain theory, see infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the promissory estoppel theory, see infra notes
80-82 and accompanying text.
26. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw (1991).
27. Id. at 5 (discussing everyday appearance of "order" in nonhierarchical,
nonlegal environment).
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preconditions for informal community governance without a major role for law. 28 Most important among these is the likelihood
of continuing relationships among the people making, enforcing
and violating the rules and the existence of multidimensional re29
lationships in the community.
While the first of these prerequisites may be met in electronic
network communities, the second usually is not. Participants in
electronic network communities may have continuing relationships, but their relationships are unidimensional; they involve
only a particular type of communication and no other important
human activities. This unidimensionality greatly weakens the
force of informal community sanctions such as social disapprobation by other members of, and ultimately expulsion from, the
community. If a violator of network community norms gets expelled, he simply can connect to another network. At least, he
can do this if the market structure is as competitive as opponents
30
of traditional common carrier regulation assert.
As the scope of networking increases, the likelihood that
users will share values and feel membership to be essential decreases. This weakens the power of the social group to enforce its
norms. The Santa Monica municipal network experience demonstrates how demand can increase for external intervention, not so
much to make rules but to enforce existing rules. 3 ' On the other
hand, MITnet, which operates in a community with a strong sense
of shared values and with interaction occurring in multiple
dimensions, finds it relatively easy to enforce its rules without
calling on authority from outside the MIT community of which it
32
is a part.
28. Id. at 8 (noting that law-and-society scholars have better understanding
of informal social controls than law-and-economics scholars, and citing as exemplary Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations In Business: A Preliminary Study,
28

AM.

Soc. REV. 55 (1963) and H.

LAURENCE

Ross,

SETTLED OUT OF COURT

(rev. ed. 1980).
29. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 26, chs. 11-14, at 184-264 (introduc-

ing norms that groups must generate to create social order without law).
30. See Perritt, supra note 1, at 92-95 (discussing application of common
carrier regulation to digital networks.)
31. The City of Santa Monica, California's Public Electronic Network (PEN)
permits citizens to access governmental information via home computer or via
20 terminals in 16 public locations. PEN offers electronic transactions with city
departments, electronic mail and access to public electronic files. A 1992 study
by William H. Dutton at the Annenberg School for Communication, University
of Southern California, University Park, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0281 showed
that users of the system wanted more control to ensure civil discussion and
decorum.
32. In a seminar sponsored on November 7, 1992 by the National Academy
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Legal Enforcement

Another practical, and democratic, possibility is that an association of networks, or of network users or network service providers, could both make and enforce rules."3 Under one set of
assumptions, this mode of rulemaking and enforcement would be
extremely informal, making the association model indistinguishable from the social community enforcement model. In a more
formal model, sufficiently distinct from the other two to make it
an interesting analytical category, the private association would
make rules through a mechanism defined in the association's constitution and bylaws, and enforce the rules either through internal
disciplinary sanctions, backed up by the ultimate power of expulsion, or through contract law.
Courts long have reviewed decisions by private associations,3 4 basing their jurisdiction on the property, contract or perof Sciences, in which the author participated, discussions with the supervisors of
the campus wide network at MIT indicated that rules for network use by students and others are enforced by reliance on social norms in the MIT
community.
33. Private associations like fraternities, churches, athletic leagues, country
clubs and trade associations are largely self-governing, both with respect to
rulemaking and adjudication. See Perkaus v. Chicago Catholic High School Athletic League, 488 N.E.2d 623, 627 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (duties of athletic league
to student injured in high school rugby game determined in part by bylaws);
Lozanoski v. Sarafin, 485 N.E.2d 669, 760-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (relationship
between local church and national church defined by acceptance of national
"statute" by local church). Courts get involved only to enforce compliance with
association rules. See Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 757 P.2d 105, 109
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing summary judgment in favor of country club officers because of factual question of whether club followed bylaws in expelling
members); Straub v. American Bowling Congress, 353 N.W.2d 11, 13-14 (Neb.
1984) (rule of judicial deference to private associations, and compliance with
association requirements, counselled affirmance of summary judgment against
member of bowling league who complained his achievements were not recognized). But see Wells v. Mobile County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 387 So. 2d 140, 14445 (Ala. 1980) (reversing declaratory judgment for defendant association; claim
of expulsion of realtor from private association was justiciable because associations constitution, bylaws, rules and regulations requiring arbitration were void
as against public policy).
34. For a detailed, though dated, discussion ofjudicial intervention in intraassociation disputes, see Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1963).
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sonal rights of members. 3 5 For example in Reid v. Gholson,3 6 the
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the appointment of a commissioner in chancery to preside over a church meeting to ensure fair
treatment of dissenters who were threatened with expulsion by
the pastor and his adherents. s7 "Simple and fundamental principles of democratic government which are universally accepted in
our society" can be enforced by a court of equity.3 8 Ordinarily,
however, because of First Amendment considerations, courts are
especially reluctant to intrude into functions like internal church
controversies involving pastor selection.3 9
When courts exercise jurisdiction over intra-associational
disputes, they employ standards for review analogous to judicial
review of decisions of administrative agencies. 40 Courts examine
the association's authority to act, 4 1 examine compliance with the
association's own rules 42 and compare the procedures under
which the association acted with common law due process standards. Occasionally courts invalidate associations' acts on the ba35. Id. at 998-1005. The author states: "While disputes involving associations sometimes may be resolved with the guidance of statutes, for the most part
courts have had to rely on common law principles to decide such controversies."
Id. at 998 (footnote omitted).
Courts utilize several theories for jurisdiction because each theory has deficiencies. See Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the
State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120, 137 (1974); see generally Willard Hurst,
Commentary: ConstitutionalIdeals and Private Associations, in NoMos XI, VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATIONS 63 U. Roland Pennrock &John W. Chapman eds., 1969) (public
has insisted through legal process that private organizations be required to exercise their powers responsibly).
36. 327 S.E.2d 107 (Va.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985).
37. Id. at 115.
38. Id. at 113.
39. See Minker v. United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356-58 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of age discrimination and contract claims based
on church bylaws because First Amendment prohibits intrusion into selection of
pastors); Reid, 327 S.E.2d at 115 ("We agree that the role of the court in resolving disputes in this area is circumscribed by the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, and that a court must exercise great restraint in this area .... );
Robert J. Bohner, Jr., Note, Religious Property Disputes and Intrinsically Religious Evidence: Towards a Narrow Application of the Neutral Principles Approach, 35 VILL. L.
REV. 949 (1990) (reviewing various approaches used by state and federal courts
to resolve disputes over church property).
40. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1988) (standards for review of administrative
agency decisions).
41. See Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp.
1213, 1223-24, 1226 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (finding baseball commissioner's deprivation of draft choice to be ultra vires and therefore void).
42. Medical Center Hosp. v. Terzis, 367 S.E.2d 728, 729 (Va. 1988) (holding hospital bylaws were contract between suspended physician and hospital,
and bylaws precluded judicial review).
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43
sis of public policy.

The associational approach is more formal than the informal
social conception, but both are democratic in character. The associational model relies on law to enforce its rules; the informal
social conception abstains from legal remedies.
IV.

CONTRACT'S ROLE

Both of the basic models considered so far are contractual in
nature: they rely on voluntary relationships with privately defined rules and some means of enforcement. 4 4 The genealogy of
modem contract law, and actions in assumpsit, implicate the same
issues raised by electronic network rules.
Professor Simpson traces the emergence of the action of assumpsit from trespass on the case. 45 Trespass on the case re43. Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 697-99
(Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (imposing minimal substantive and procedural due process
restrictions on private hospital's decision to exclude physician from staff; justified based on "fiduciary responsibility" to community); Falcone v. Middlesex
County Medical Soc'y, 170 A.2d 791, 799-800 (NJ. 1961) (requiring medical
association to admit osteopath on public policy grounds).
When hearing intra-association disputes, courts act much as they do in administrative law cases by refusing a de novo decision on the facts of the disputes,
relying instead upon internal factfinding procedures. See Coveney v. President
of Holy Cross College, 445 N.E.2d 136, 138-39 (Mass. 1983) (holding college
may not dismiss student arbitrarily or capriciously, but when acting in good faith
and on reasonable grounds, decisions are not subject to challenge); see also
Dowd v. Society of St. Columbans, 861 F.2d 761, 763 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying
resjudicata and rejecting priest's claim against religious order for abandonment;
deferring to internal conciliation procedures). Courts defer to the rules of the
associations, as they do to rules of administrative agencies, and permit associations to change rules. See Coveny, 445 N.E.2d at 139 ("A college must have broad
discretion in determining appropriate sanctions for violations of its policies.").
Compare Randolph v. First Baptist Church, 120 N.E.2d 485, 488-96 (C.C.P. Ohio
1954) (holding church could not expel member in complete disregard of its constitutional provisions governing expulsion) with Gillespie v. Elkins S. Baptist
Church, 350 S.E.2d 715, 719 (W. Va. 1986) (approving decision of congregational church to terminate pastor because pastor could show no breach of contract, jeopardy to public policy, or irregularity in church procedures).
44. Professor Simpson noted that there always have been an assortment of
systems for dealing with contractual obligation, including the courts of Piepowder relating to medieval markets and fairs, special bodies of law applicable
to colleges and religious organizations and the law merchant. ALFRED W.B.
SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE
ACTION OF ASsuMPsIT 4 (1975).

45. Id. at 199. Professor Simpson states:
The characteristic feature of these actions was that in them a plaintiff
was allowed to claim damages by way of compensation for a wrong
which had been done to him. In this respect trespass actions embodied
a legal technique which was quite different from the technique of the
ancient real actions, in which the claimant demanded the seisin of land,
and quite different also from the technique of the ancient contractual
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quired the plaintiff to allege the factual circumstances giving rise
to the claim so that the defendant could appear and show cause
why he should not be held liable, and also required the plaintiff to
explain why the alleged facts showed violation of a duty. 4 6 In
other words, the plaintiff had to plead the existence of a rule, a
duty, and that the defendant had violated the duty.
One way the plaintiff could show that the defendant was
under a duty was through prior transactions between plaintiff and
defendant. 4 7 Some of the earliest cases in which prior transactions established a duty involved suits against ferrymen and
smiths. 48 A duty was also imposed upon innkeepers apparently
based on "a general custom of the realm which required innkeepers to look after their guest's goods."' 4 9 The innkeeper's duties
based on the law of realm included a duty to "receive guests
whether he liked it or not." 50 Although ferrymen, doctors, smiths
and others who engaged in "common callings" could have had
obligations based on external law rather than on past transactions, the earliest basis for liability was transactional-a basis
looking remarkably like the modern idea that conduct, course of
dealing, and custom and practice can give rise to contractual obligations. 5 ' A common hostler had a duty to provide food for horses at the market price and a duty to receive guests and their
horses. 52 A common galor was obligated to receive certain
actions of debt, detinue, and covenant, where the claimant demanded
the specific recovery of the debt, the chattel or charter, or the actual
performance of the covenant.
Id.
46. Id. at 200.
47. Id. at 205. This duty arising from prior transactions was a development
of the fourteenth century. Id. It is distinguished from duties arising out of external law (based on property rights and customs). "At the end of the fourteenth century it came to be established that such persons could be sued by
action on the case for their misconduct, and their liability was based upon the
prior informal transaction which they had entered into with the plaintiff." Id. at
205-06.
48. Id. at 204 (noting that liability stemmed from incompetence in handling
animals).
49. Id. at 205.
50. Id. at 206.
51. Id. at 206-207 (noting alternative basis for liability of persons engaged
in common callings). It is appropriate to acknowledge Professor Simpson's early
assumpsit examples involving past transactions involve liability for loss of goods
rather than liability for performance of a bargain. Id. at 210-222 (discussing
cases including loss of mare on ferry). Professor Simpson is careful to rebut the
notion that duties of those engaged in common callings were based on special
skill. Id. at 231. He explains that common laborers were under a duty to serve
whomever offered to retain them under the statutes of laborers. Id.
52. Id. at 231.
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classes of prisoners, and if offered ready money, a common vict53
ualler had a duty to sell food in the market at the market price.
The historical emergence of assumpsit from dependent,
though voluntarily defined, commercial arrangements is a model
for emergence of appropriate contract law.
V.

CONTRACT'S DOCTRINES

Contract law permits suppliers and their customers to decide
for themselves what terms of access are appropriate and how the
risk of liability resulting from messages handled should be allocated between them. 54 It accommodates and shapes both the authoritarian and the democratic models of rulemaking for
electronic networks.
There are four major contract law issues that are likely to be
involved in disputes between network service providers and their
customers:
1. To what extent is a relational contract view more appropriate than a neo-classical view? This is the relational contract issue.
2. Is a declaration of service terms unilaterally issued by the
service provider a contract at all? This is the contract formation
issue.
3. How much power has the service provider reserved to terminate the contract or to modify it? This is the contract modification question.
4. How should the express terms of any contractual relationship be interpreted, how should missing terms be supplied and
who should do this interpreting? These are contract interpretation questions.
The relational contract issue is of importance to both the authoritarian and the democratic model, and the contract formation
issue is of particular importance to the authoritarian model. The
contract modification and interpretation issues are of equal importance to both rulemaking models. The following sections of
the Article explore these issues in the following way. First, the
Article introduces the relational contract theory, and explains
53. Id. at 232. It is not clear whether these obligations were enforceable on
the case or through criminal proceedings. Id. at 231-32. This history is somewhat blurry because the modern distinction between tort and contract did not
exist at all, and duties based on explicit promises or undertakings were only
gradually emerging from trespass on the case.
54. Contract cannot, however, bind third parties, which leaves a major gap
in regulating liability for injury resulting from messages.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 2

366

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 349

how it guides relaxation of some of the formal rules of classical
contract law.
The Article then considers contract formation, modification
and termination in the context of three different bodies of case
law which are analogous in some ways to the electronic network
setting: advertisement cases, credit card cases and employment
cases. These bodies of caselaw support two opposing views of the
contract between service provider and user. One view, most
favorable to the provider, treats each network transaction as a
separate contract, and permits the provider to modify the terms
of the contract, or to disconnect the user between any two transactions. This view is supported by the advertisement and credit
card cases. The opposing view, drawn from the employment
cases, would interpret the contract to limit both modification and
55
termination powers in the service provider.
A.

Relational Contracts

The relational view of contract disputes the implicit model of
the bargain theory of contract, which presupposes that two parties with roughly equivalent bargaining power sit down across a
table and negotiate contract terms, and sue for breach of contract
if the terms are not honored. 5 6 The bargain theory of contract
55. All of the case law would permit the default arrangements to be
changed by explicit terms in the service provider's specification. For example,
under the advertisement and credit card cases, a service specification could specifically state that it becomes enforceable as soon as a request for service is
made. For a discussion of these cases see, infra notes 83-133 and accompanying
text. Similarly, the contract formed by a request for service could be terminable
or modifiable only under certain conditions if the specification says so.
56. Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, MacNeil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and
Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565, 569. "What MacNeil and Macaulay
brought to surface awareness was that the images of classical contract law described at best a small and residual body of contract dealings: 'discrete transactions' . . . between strangers." Id.
The relational contract "school," that characterized Macaulay and MacNeil
from the 1960s onward, grew out of the Legal Realism movement of the 1920s
and 1930s. Id. at 566. The Legal Realists undertook two projects that had the
result of significantly altering contract law. The first project was to critique the
classical contract model by contextualizing its application. Id. By analyzing the
application of classical contract principles by courts, it became apparent that
classical contract law was inadequate in its ability to confront different fact situations. The second project undertaken was to replace existing notions of contract with "a law that would be more solidly founded on the empirical
regularities observed in the decided cases." Id. "The result was a body of distinguished work . . . showing that contextual considerations . . . both did and
should influence judicial decisions whether contracts had been formed, modified, breached, or excused, and what remedies should be given."
Id. at 566-67.
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envisions a relationship that is far removed from reality. In this
idealized relationship, the supplier of service and each customer
negotiate each term of their contract, memorializing it in a document that both sign. They anticipate each significant contingency
and each area of possible dispute and address them in explicit
57
terms of the contract.
In contrast, the relational school recognizes that many contracts involve unilateral specification of terms as well as continuing relationships during which modifications are made and
assented to, sometimes formally and sometimes informally.58
The relational school also emphasizes that the relevant sanction
for an unacceptable violation of expectations is to terminate the
relationship. 59 The threat of a lawsuit plays only a background
role. 6 0
These realities link the relational view of contract with both
the authoritarian and democratic models of rulemaking for networks. Termination of the relationship, rather than a lawsuit, is
the usual remedy in both authoritarian and democratic models.
Informal practice is the core idea of the democratic model, while
unilateral rule specification defines the authoritarian model. Both
these opposing practices are relational, compared with the ideal6
ized formal negotiation model. '
Under the relational theory, obligations are not frozen in an
57. For a discussion of the concept of classical contract law, see Gordon,
supra note 56, at 568-69.
58. Id. at 569.
59. Id.
60. Relational contract proponents Stewart Macauley and Ian Macneil emphasize that parties to real-world transactions do not concern themselves with
the classical model of contract formation and administration; rather, they work
things out in order to maintain continuing relationships. Gordon, supra note 56,
at 569.
Macaulay in particular pictures the occasional resort by private parties
to formal legal sanctions as mostly opportunistic and tactical: by going
to law, the parties are not appealing to shared values embodied in legal
rules, or seeking moral vindication of their position or ajust settlement
of their disputes; they are usually engaged in maneuvers to improve
their bargaining positions.
Id. at 572.
61. Applying contract doctrine to all kinds of transactions is becoming
more relational in character as time passes. The Restatement (Second) of the
Law of Contracts (1981) cites the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as an example of the kinds of relational contract doctrines that should be applied to
contracts in general. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 19 cmt.
b (1981) (citing U.C.C. § 1-201(25)); id. § 22 reporter's note (citing U.C.C. §§ 2204(2), 2-206, 2-207(3)); id. §§ 200-17 (frequently referring to U.C.C.); id.
§§ 220-23 (same).
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initial bargain. They evolve over time as circumstances change,
guided by norms of the particular community within which the
relation exists. "Parties treat their contracts more like marriages
than like one-night stands." 62 The object of contracting is to establish and define a cooperative relationship, not merely to allocate risk. If performance falls short on either side, the parties are
expected to accommodate each other rather than insisting on
technical performance. The sanction for unacceptable performance is to terminate the relationship and to refuse to deal in the
future.6 3 The coercive power of the state, activated through
breach-of-contract litigation, sits in the background as a means of
changing bargaining power, but it does not preoccupy the parties
in defining their relationship or in seeking remedies for
disappointment. 64
62. Gordon, supra note 56, at 569.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 572. For a discussion of relational contracts, see supra note 56 and
accompanying text. Labor and employment contracts fit comfortably within the
relational contract model. See Ian R. Macneil, RelationalContract: What We Do and
Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483, 497 [hereinafter Relational Contract] (noting
Lon Fuller and Karl Llewellyn incorporated relational contract ideas into promise-centered neoclassical contract theory); id. at 498 (citing HAROLD HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT (1961) as another work dealing with
relational aspects of promise-centered contract); id. at 494 n.40 (citing Clyde W.
Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969));
id. at 498 n.59 (citing Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations,
68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955) and Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958)).
David Feller notes that the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that some
aspects of labor law continue to embrace a contract notion, tends to view collective bargaining agreements as governmental codes rather than as contracts.
David Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CAL. L. REV.
663, 704 (1973) (noting rejection of Black and Fortas views embracing self-government view of collective agreement). Feller also notes that when union
presents an employee's claim, the collective agreement is viewed as instrument
of government, but when an employee sues both union and employer, the collective agreement is viewed as a contract. Id. at 718. Feller emphasizes that
employers and unions do not write collective bargaining agreements primarily
as documents to be applied in court; they write them to establish a system of
ongoing rules to govern the workplace. Id. at 720-71 (identifying function of
rules, rule-modifying and rule-applying institutions in meeting needs of employers, unions and employees in ongoing relationship).
Archibald Cox, writing earlier, agrees. See Archibald Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 605 (1956) (noting that principles for handling collective agreements should not be imposed from traditional legal
doctrine, but should be "drawn out of the institutions of labor relations and
shaped to their needs").
Of course, the Supreme Court's treatment of collective agreements as a
kind of "constitution" for the workplace in the Steelworkers trilogy is highly relational in outlook. See Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
(holding that judiciary has no business weighing merits of grievance when deciding whether to compel arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreement);
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Because, under the relational theory, the parties expect that
the terms of their relationship will evolve, there is no need for
formalities to validate new practices in order to make those practices part of the contract. The central idea of the relational theory
is that the parties are obligated to behave in a way that promotes
the relationship 6 5 and is consistent with the needs and expectations of both parties. 66 Simply doing something becomes a
stronger part of the contractual relationship (if it is unobjection67
able) the longer it continues.
The classical contract-as-promise theory is able to accommodate the modification-through-conduct idea, but with more difficulty. 68 Classical and neoclassical theories use course-of-dealing
and trade usage evidence as means of interpreting the terms of
preexisting contracts. 69 The broad use of extrinsic evidence like
70
this is a relational approach.
Three norms describe the relationship between the parties to
a contract and the resulting need for sovereign intrusion into that
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (same);
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (same).
65. Relational contract theorists have not yet developed a comprehensive
body of legal rules and doctrine to replace the classical and neoclassical doctrines they criticize. Relational contract theory has, however, helped to legitimize some doctrines already recognized. The implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 215 (1981) is
one such doctrine.
66. Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract:Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
340, 361 (1983) [hereinafter Values in Contract] (describing relational norms that
characterize ongoing contractual relations).
67. See Gordon, supra note 56, at 569 ("Obligations grow out of the commitment that [the parties] have made to one another, and the conventions that
the trading community establishes for such commitments .... ").
68. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981). Professor MacNeil argues that for contract-as-promise proponents, the "promise, and promise alone is the dogmatic base" on which contractual analysis rests. Values in Contract,supra note 66, at 390. Thus, to include
an obligation that is external to the initial set of promises in the contractual
relationship, additional promises must be made. Id.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(5) (1981).
70. Dean Murray emphasizes the difference between the first and second
Restatements of Contracts, noting that the second is significantly more hospitable to extrinsic evidence as a guide to interpretation. JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §§ 106-07, 109-14 (3d. ed. 1974) [hereinafter MURRAY ON

CONTRACTS]. This interpretation approach is limited as it has difficulty dealing
with consensual practices that deviate significantly from the express terms of the
written instrument. It is ironic to say that conduct "interprets" terms when it
practically rebuts express terms or dramatically changes them.
Macneil characterizes the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as "the largest
body of American relational contracts scholarship." Relational Contract, supra
note 64, at 497.
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relationship: the reciprocity norm, the power relationship norm
and the legitimacy of means norm.
The reciprocity norm in relational contracts is more flexible
than the traditional consideration concept. 7 t The parties deal
with each other in the context of a relationship that gives validity

to the commitments they make to each other. In a network services context, the reciprocity norm implies obligations on both
parties derived from the context of their past dealings with each
other, regardless of explicit promises and without a requirement
of formal consideration.
The power relationship norm describes sovereign regulation
of the relative power of the parties to a contract. 72 In a contract
sense, power can be thought of as the ability to alter the relationship between the parties so as to benefit the party possessing
more relative power. Sovereign regulation of the relationship is
necessary if there is no counterpoise to the power held by one
party. 7 3 If, however, an adequate counterpoise exists, either because of bargaining power evidenced through an individual contract or because of an established procedure for participating in
decisionmaking, then there is less need to impose limitations, to
reallocate power, through legal default rules. In the network context, if the explicit terms of the contract protect only the interests
of the network service provider, the power relationship norm suggests that the law supply terms that protect the network user.
The legitimacy of means norm74 requires something like
71. The imposition of reciprocity stems from an analysis of the imposition
of sovereign values on contract. Values in Contract, supra note 66, at 374. Reciprocity is imposed where it is believed (by the sovereign in some legislative,
administrative or judicial capacity) that it would not occur in absence of the imposition. Id. The reciprocity norm means that past exchange between the parties justifies imposing future restrictions on one party's rights in the contractual
relation, including the right to terminate. Id. at 374-75. The requirement of
consideration in the formation of a contract is a reflection of the reciprocity
norm identified in the relational contract literature. Id.
72. Values in Contract, supra note 66, at 375-76.
73. Otherwise, the counterpoise is put into operation by the sovereign. For
example, the National Labor Relations Act "aims largely to increase the power
of employees over their employers." Values in Contract, supra note 66, at 376.
One way that the power relationship norm differs from the reciprocity norm
is in the context of party choice. "When the sovereign creates countervailing
power, it also reduces the choices available to the parties." Id. Reciprocity limits the choices of one of the two parties in a contractual relationship. For a
discussion of reciprocity, see supra note 71 and accompanying text. Thus, reciprocity concerns the substantive terms of the contractual relationship while the
power norm regulates the ability on the part of one party to have excessive control over substantive terms.
74. Professor MacNeil refers to this norm as the "propriety of means." See
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what arbitrators require as "due process." '75 If a network services
provider promises a facially fair procedure for deciding disputes
and commits at least to an objectively reasonable basis for decisions under the procedure, then the law should not substitute a
different standard of conduct. If, however, the express contract is
silent on these matters, the requirements of the legitimacy of
means norm must be imposed from outside the relationship. 76
In an electronic network context, relational contract theory is
a useful aid to understanding the interrelationship among these
three norms. Relational contract theory treats the legal relationship like a continuing community relationship rather than an arms
length one-shot commercial deal. As a result, relational contract
theory represents an intellectual bridge between the two natural
persons negotiating the terms of a contract across a bargaining
table.
Relational contract theory also recognizes the realities of the
agreement process. It contemplates unilaterally suggested terms,
accepted by a member of an undefined class, which are then modified from time to time by the original proposer of the terms. In
other words, relational contract makes it easier to harmonize neoclassical contract theories with the realities of electronic networks. 77 Thus, relational contract theory justifies implied terms
to protect consumers of network services and justifies scrutiny of
dispute resolution processes.
Relational contract is highly pertinent to some, but not all, of
the electronic network models discussed above. The relational
model fits the democratic rulemaking model, with either social or

formal legal enforcement. Also, the authoritarian rulemaking
model with formal legal enforcement and a view of the contractual
Values in Contract, supra note 66, at 378. This norm refers to government intervention directed at "changing the means by which parties conduct themselves,
rather than the substance of their conduct." Id.
75. In fact, the norm itself may be defined in different contexts by reference
to due process requirements. See, e.g., OWEN FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 312-56 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing borrowing and
modifying of criminal due process concepts to apply in labor arbitration forum).
76. See Values in Contract, supra note 66, at 378. ("The effect of due process
on choice is clear enough respecting the party upon which it is imposed, at least
in the short run: it curtails choice whenever that side would not have introduced
such process on its own initiative ....").
77. Relational contract also harmonizes neoclassical contract theory with
reality in the employment context. In the employment context, as in the network services context, the more powerful party sets the terms unilaterally. The
challenge for contract law is to set criteria for deciding when these terms are
enforceable without relying unduly on incongruent artificial theories of actual
bargaining between equal parties.
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relationship that results in ongoing contracts between service
providers and network users is relational. On the other hand, the
authoritarian rulemaking model with formal legal enforcement is
not relational if the contract is one in a series of one shot contracts limited to the duration of each network transaction. Lastly,
the authoritarian rulemaking model with disconnection enforcement is not relational because it is not contractual.
B.

Contract Formation

Any contract-law model for regulating electronic networks
necessitates attention to contract formation. If the legal requirements for formation of a contract are not satisfied in usual network relationships, the contract model is of no use.
Contract law is reasonably flexible on how contracts can be
formed. 78 Whenever someone makes an offer, that person can
specify the way in which the offer is to be accepted and also indicate by the content of the offer, the circumstances under which it
is made and what sort of an exchange is sought. 79 The offer can
specify that it may be accepted by conduct (e.g., hitting the enter
key on one's computer) or by making a promise (e.g., giving a
credit card number representing an implied promise to pay).
When the party to whom the offer is addressed (the offeree)
performs the conduct specified or makes the promise specified,
he or she accepts the offer.80 Typically, this conduct or promise
also constitutes the offeree's half of the desired exchange. The
81
offeree's half of the exchange is frequently called consideration.
As discussed above, there is another way a promise can be
enforced, even without specifications for methods of acceptance
or exchanges: through detrimental reliance.8 2 The description
78. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30 (1981). This section states in part: "An offer may invite or require acceptance to be made by an
affirmative answer in words, or by performing or refraining from performing a
specified act, or may empower the offeree to make a selection of terms in his
acceptance." Id. § 30(1).
79. See id. § 30 cmt. a (1981) ("The offeror is the master of his offer. The
terms of the offer may limit acceptance to a particular mode .... "); id. § 60
(1981) ("If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of acceptance its terms
in this respect must be complied with in order to create a contract.").
80. See, e.g., id. § 32 (1981) ("In case of doubt an offer is interpreted as
inviting the offeree to accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by rendering performance, as the offeree chooses.").
8 1. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 70, § 28, at 51 (noting consideration
among six essential elements to formation of contract).
82. For a discussion of the authoritarian rulemaking model introducing detrimental reliance, see supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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of the authoritarian rulemaking model with legal enforcement
provides an overview of both the bargained-for-exchange concept
and the detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel concept.
Both concepts fit, albeit imperfectly, the realities of the authoritarian electronic network model.
Electronic network transactions share some factual characteristics with mass advertisement, credit card and employment transactions. Contract formation cases in those areas thus are useful.
1. Advertisement Cases
Statements made in advertisements and made with respect to
goods displayed in stores traditionally were construed as solicitation of offers rather than offers. 8 3 The significance of this characterization is that a solicitation is not an offer; it does not create a
power of acceptance in a person desiring to buy on the terms expressed in the advertisement. Rather, the power of acceptance
comes into being only when a subsequent offer actually is made,
perhaps by the purchaser, which the seller then accepts. This
general rule is inapplicable, however, when the advertisement
makes a promise, for example a statement of definite price, ac' '8 4
companied by the phrase, "first come, first served.
The justification for the general rule is a concern that treating an advertisement as an offer would expose the advertiser to
unpredictably large liability for breach of contract; neither the
identity nor the number of offerees is known when the advertisement is published. 5 The most famous case rejecting the general
rule is Carlillv. CarbolicSmoke Ball Co. ,86 in which an advertisement
promised to pay a 100 pound reward to anyone contracting a cold
after using the advertised smoke ball. Evidencing promissory intent, the advertisement also said that it had deposited 100 pounds
with a bank as a kind of escrow agent. 8 7 The court found that the
nature of the communication evidenced an intent to take on the
88
risk of a large number of offerees.
The danger of treating advertisements as offers is illustrated,
83. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 70, § 34, at 69 (citing Foremost Pro
Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983)).

84.

MURRAY ON CONTRACTS,

supra note 70, at 69 (citing Lefkowitz v. Great

Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957)).
85. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 70, § 34, at 70.
86. 1 Q.B. 256 (1893), discussed in MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 70,
§ 34, at 70.
87. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 70, § 34, at 70.
88. Id. at 71.
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but avoided, by the results in Mesaros v. United States. 89 The
United States Mint, a federal government instrumentality, published and mailed advertisements for commemorative Statute of
Liberty coins. The advertisement contained language suggesting
a contract: "Please accept my order ....
I understand that all
sales are final .... If my order is received by December 31, 1985,
I will be entitled to purchase the coins .... I have read, understand and agree to the above." 90 Other parts of the circular, however, expressly reserved the right to limit quantities "subject to
availability." 9 '
The orders for a particular coin (a $5.00 gold piece) exceeded the supply. When the value of these coins went up by
200% within a few months, the disappointed potential buyers
sued. 92 Further motivation to sue came when the potential buyers learned that credit card orders placed earlier than orders with
checks and money orders were not filled while the later orders
93
including checks and money orders were filled.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reviewed case law that overwhelmingly favored the general rulethat advertisements are initiations to deal or solicitations of offers
and not offers themselves. 94 The court reiterated this rationale as
applied to the facts of the case. "Otherwise, the advertiser could
be bound by an excessive number of contracts requiring delivery
of goods far in excess of amounts available." 9 5 The Mint was lim89. 845 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming summary judgment for

defendant).
90. Id. at 1578 (quoting advertising circular).
91. Id. at 1578 n.2.
92. Id. at 1578-79 (describing background facts).
93. Id. The record showed a significant amount of confusion relating to the
processing of credit card orders. Id. The disappointed credit card customers
were sent form letters informing them either that the mint "tried but was unable" to process their credit card orders or that the gold coins sold out. Id.
However, the record indicates that the rejection of collector's credit cards was
not based on any shortage of credit or on any inaccuracies in the information
provided to the mint. Id.
94. Id. at 1580-81 (citing cases and SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACT § 27 (3d ed. 1957) and ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 25,

28 (1963 ed.)). The court of appeals accepted that jurisdiction existed in the
claims court because a claimant alleged breach of contract against the government. Id. at 1580 (jurisdiction based on Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)).
95. Id. at 1581. The court noted that in the instant case, the advertisement
stated that production of the gold coins was limited to 500,000 by an act of
Congress. Id. The court also noted that the order form included the language,
"please accept my order," which the court concluded was an offer from the
buyer to the mint to purchase the coins. Id. (citing 1 ARTHUR L.
TRACTS

CORBIN, CON-

§ 88, at 375-76 (1963)). Finally, the court distinguished the case from
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ited by Congressional authorization to 500,000 coins, and the
number of people seeking the coins did in fact exceed the supply.
A leading commentator, Dean Murray, suggests that the appropriate inquiry to distinguish offers from solicitation of offers is
the definiteness of the communication. Dean Murray's approach
is entirely consistent with the Restatement of Contracts' proviso: offers must manifest a willingness to enter into a bargain that would
justify the offeree believing that his assent to a bargain is invited. 9 6 While the Restatement presumes that advertisements are
intended as solicitations of offers rather than offers, 97 it also acknowledges that it is possible to make an offer by an advertisement directed to the general public. 98 Also, a communication not
in and of itself an offer may contain promises or representations
that are incorporated in a subsequent offer and thus become part
of the eventual contract. "Indeed, the preliminary communication may thus form part of a written contract, or of a memorandum satisfying the statute of frauds, or of an integrated
contract. '9 9 As with other offers, the crucial inquiry is what intent
was manifested by the words of the offer and the circumstances
under which it was made.oo
This approach is appropriate in the network services context
and is supported by common policy concerns. What happens if
an unexpectedly large number of persons "accept" the "offer"
made by the published terms of service? If a large number of
people "accept," is it a breach of contract for the network services
Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957), in
which the court held that an advertisement constituted an offer. In Lefkowitz, a
store advertised a fur stole worth $139.50 for sale for $1.00 on a first-come, firstserved basis and then refused to sell the stole to the first potential buyer. Id. at
690. The Mesaros court distinguished Lefkowitz in that in Mesaros the advertisement did not include the words "first-come, first-served." Mesaros, 845 F.2d at
1581.
96. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 70, § 34, at 73 & n.85 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981)).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1981).
98. Id. (referring to § 29). Section 29 of the Restatement explicitly acknowledges that an offer may create a power of acceptance in a specified group
or class of persons. Id. § 29. A comment notes that an offer may create separate
powers of acceptance in an unlimited number of persons, and the exercise of the
power by one person may or may not extinguish the power of another. Id.
99. Id. § 26 cmt. f. This idea is crucial in contract interpretation in the network context. Hitting the enter key may be an offer that is accepted when the
remote computer responds. The terms of the cryptic contract are those expressed in advertisements and other pre-contractual service specifications.
100. Id. § 24 ("An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a
bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to
that bargain is invited and will conclude it.")
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provider not to provide service or to provide materially worse service than that "promised?"
Considering the underlying policy concerns, it is better to
conclude that the contract for network services is formed, not
when the network user makes a request for service, but when the
network accepts the request for service. A statement of terms is a
solicitation of offers, a request for service is an offer to make a
contract on the terms represented by the service providers unilateral specification of those terms. The commencement of service
by the network is an acceptance of the offer on those terms.
Yet, once a contract is formed, two related issues remain unresolved: Did the service provider reserve the power to change
the terms of the agreement, and are there limitations on the
power of the service provider to disconnect service? These issues
should be considered in the context of the following discussion of
credit card and employment cases.
2.

Credit Card Cases

Terms of access published by a network services provider are
not unlike the terms published by the issuer of a credit card. The
issuer intends to communicate with a very large number of people, who subsequently enter into discrete transactions, presumably under the published terms. There are differences, however.
Usually, full credit card terms are published only to someone who
the credit card issuer selects to receive a card. The terms of network access well may be published to a larger universe of people
who then decide whether they use the network. In this respect,
the published terms of network service look more like an advertisement than the terms of credit card usage.
The prevailing view is that credit card terms do not constitute
enforceable contracts.' 0 ' Rather, they are revocable offers of
contracts, which the card holder accepts each time he or she uses
the credit card.' 0 2 "The credit card relationship, properly analyzed, should be viewed as an offer by the issuer to create the
opportunity for a series of unilateral contracts which are actually
formed when the holder uses the credit card to buy goods or serv101. See, e.g., Garber v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309, 1312
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) ("[P]revailing view in this country is that the issuance of
credit card is only an offer to extend credit.").
102. See In re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082, 1087 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., dissenting) ("[U]nilateral contracts are formed each time the card is used.").
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3

0
ices or to obtain cash."'1
For example, Garberv. HarrisTrust & Savings Bank 104 involved
a lawsuit by a class of credit card holders who claimed that the
card issuers breached the card holder agreement by changing the
terms on which the issuer would extend credit. 0 5 The plaintiffs
argued that the card holder agreements were binding contracts
that required the issuer to continue to extend credit on the terms
stipulated therein.' 0 6 They argued that applications, brochures,
07
and advertisements by the issuers were solicitations of offers.
The credit applications submitted by potential card holders were
offers, and issuance of the credit card accompanied by the pub08
lished terms constituted acceptances.'
The card issuers argued that the issuance of the card was the
offer to extend credit, and that the user accepts this offer by use
of the card.' 0 9 Only upon use of the card did the published terms
become a binding contract."1 0 The Garber court affirmed dismissal."' l The court discussed Georgia and New Jersey cases that
supported the card issuer's position." 2 The terms of credit card

103. Id. at 1087 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (arguing that bank did not assume
risk of nonpayment when card was issued).
104. 432 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
105. Id. at 1310.
106. Id. at 1312. The plaintiffs argued that Steinberg v. Chicago Medical
School, 371 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. 1977), supported their theory. Garber, 432 N.E.2d
at 1312. The Steinberg court found a cause of action existed for breach of contract when an applicant to medical school submitted an application in response
to an invitation expressed in the medical school catalogue, but the medical
school failed to evaluate the application according to the criteria set forth in the
catalogue. Steinberg, 371 N.E.2d at 638. The Steinberg court concluded that the
submission of the application and the payment of fee was an offer to apply,
which was accepted by receipt of the application and acceptance of the fee. Steinberg, 371 N.E.2d at 641. The Garbercourt rejected Steinberg as applicable, noting
that Garber did not allege a refusal to accept an application for a credit card
under the advertised terms. Garber, 432 N.E.2d at 1312-13.
107. Garber, 432 N.E.2d at 1311. The court's opinion does not indicate
whether the advertisements and brochures were sent directly to the plaintiffs.
108. Id. (characterizing plaintiff's argument).
109. Id.
110. Id. ("In other words, each use of the credit card constitutes a separate
contract between the parties.").
111. Id. at 1316.
112. Id. at 1311-12 (citing City Stores Co. v. Henderson, 156 S.E.2d 818
(Ga. App. 1967) and Novack v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 374 A.2d 89 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Law Div. (1977)), aff'd, 388 A.2d 264 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 396
A.2d 583 (NJ. 1978)).
In City Stores, the plaintiffs brought an action for tortious misconduct based
upon an alleged refusal, without prior notice of revocation, by a store clerk to
extend further credit to one of the plaintiffs when she sought to charge
purchases at the store. City Stores, 156 S.E.2d at 820. The court, discussing the
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usage could not provide the basis for a contract, even if they were
intended as an offer, because there was no consideration. 1 3 No
performance or return promise existed until the credit card was
used and there was no obligation to use the card."14 Moreover, if
the terms did support a contract, the contract was of indefinite
duration and thus, terminable at will. 15 Because the contract is

terminable at will, the contract terms "can be modified at any
time by either party."' "16 Notwithstanding the power to modify a
terminable-at-will contract, in this case, the court noted that modifications were permitted because they were expressly provided
17
for in the original published terms.'
In a later case, with similar facts, a federal court reached a
contrary conclusion. Gray v. American Express Company 1 8 involved
a breach of contract action brought by a card holder whose card
had been canceled. The card issuer refused to authorize a particular charge after an unresolved dispute over some earlier and unrelated charges." 9 The plaintiff claimed that the cancellation
nature of the relationship between a cardholder and a card issuer stated: "The
issuance of a credit card is but an offer to extend a line of open account credit.
It is unilateral and supported by no consideration . . . and its withdrawal
breaches no duty." Id. at 823.
The City Stores language was quoted with approval in Novack v. Cities Service Oil Co., 374 A.2d 89 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. (1977)), aff'd, 388 A.2d 264
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 396 A.2d 583 (N.J. 1978), in which the
plaintiff argued that the cancellation of his credit card breached the contractual
relationship between the company and himself. The court found that no contractual relationship was created by the issuance and receipt of the credit card.
Id.
113. Garber, 432 N.E.2d at 1313. The court stated: "Mutuality of obligation
is lacking. Such mutuality exists when both parties to an agreement are bound."
Id. The court further stated that though mutuality of obligation is not essential
to the validity of a contract, it can substitute for consideration when there is no
other consideration for a contract. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court stated: "Where no definite time is fixed during which
an executory contract shall continue in force, it is terminable at the will of either
party." Id. at 1313-14 (quoting Gage v. Village of Wilmette, 146 N.E. 325 (Ill.
1924)).
116. Id. at 1314.
117. Id. The court noted that the challenged modifications were expressly
listed as provisions in the cardholder agreement. Id. The agreement included
"change of terms" and "cancellation" provisions. Id. The agreement also contained language indicating that the credit company could amend the cardholder
agreement with respect to future purchases and could amend the agreement to
limit or terminate the cardholder's privileges. Id.
118. 743 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
119. Id. at 13. Following billings arising out of deferred travel charges by
Gray, disputes arose regarding the amount due to American Express. Id. After
considerable correspondence, American Express decided to cancel Gray's card.
Id. Gray was not notified of the cancellation until he attempted to use his card to
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violated the terms of a contract represented by the card member
1 20
agreement.
Much of the analysis in Gray involved application of a federal
statute that prohibited termination of a credit card agreement until certain procedural steps were taken with respect to disputed
charges.' 2 ' The status of the card member agreement pertained
to the statutory claim because American Express argued that, in
the agreement, American Express expressly reserved the power
to cancel the agreement with or without cause and thus was permitted to cancel the agreement notwithstanding the limitation in
the statute, an22 argument the court of appeals characterized as
"audacious."1
The court of appeals concluded that the act's notice provision applied and remanded the statutory claim for
23
trial. '
In Gray, the plaintiff also brought an independent state law
contract claim arguing that the issuer was not free to cancel the
right to use the card "without notice."' 124 The court of appeals
reversed the district court's determination that the terminationat-will and without-notice provision in the cardholder agreement
was enforceable.' 2 5 Without addressing the issue directly, it is
apparent from the court's analysis that the Gray court began this
section of the opinion with the assumption that the cardholder
agreement was a contract.' 2 6 Having assumed that a contract existed, the Gray court distinguished earlier cases, including Garber,
pay for a wedding anniversary dinner and the restaurant informed Gray that
American Express had refused to accept the charges for the meal and had instructed the restaurant to confiscate and destroy the card. Id. At that time, Gray
spoke to the American Express representative on the phone who informed him
that his account was canceled. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 13-15. The Fair Credit Billing Act ("Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 16661666j (1988), prescribes an orderly procedure for identifying and resolving disputes between a cardholder and a card issuer. The Act, along with many other
provisions of the Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1693, was amended
by the Truth-In-Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. 96-221, tit. VI,
94 Stat. 168 (1982).
122. 743 F.2d at 15.
123. Id. at 16.
124. Id. (concluding that choice of law principles require application of
New York law).
125. Id. at 20.
126. Id. at 17. After discussing the choice of law question, the court identified the applicable issue as whether the "without notice" termination provision
in the cardholder agreement was enforceable. Id. The court then applied contract principles to reach the conclusion that the provision was unenforceable. Id.
at 17-20. Implicit is this identification of the issue and in the subsequent analysis
is the fact that the court considered the agreement to be a contract.
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in which the courts concluded that the agreement did not repre27
sent a contract.'
A subsequent case, Feder v. Fortunoff,Inc. ,128 prompted an an-

notation. 29 Mr. Feder sued a department store after the department store, following instructions from Citicorp, seized his
Citicorp credit card.' 30 He asserted conversion and prima facie
tort claims.' 3 ' The appellate division agreed with the trial court
that Mr. Feder had no cause of action: "The issuance of a credit
card constitutes an offer of credit which may be withdrawn by the
offeror at any time prior to acceptance of the offer through the
use of the card by the holder."' 32 Consequently, once Citicorp
revoked the offer of credit, it had a superior property interest in
the card. 133

Followed strictly in the authoritarian model of electronic network services, the credit card cases would permit the service provider to change the terms of the contract virtually continuously.
Each request for service would be an offer of a new contract. If
the network provided service on that occasion, a contract would
be formed only for the duration of that particular transaction on
the network. Because no contract would be in existence otherwise, the service provider would remain free to disconnect at al127. Id. at 20 (citing Novack v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 374 A.2d 89 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977), aft'd, 388 A.2d 264 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert.
denied, 396 A.2d 583 (N.J. 1978); City Stores v. Henderson, 156 S.E.2d 818 (Ga.
App. 1967); Garber v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 432 NE.2d 1309 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982)). The court noted that none of the cases advanced by the appellees involved situations in which cardmembers were charged annual fees. Id. Furthermore, none of the cases American Express cited treated the parties' relationship
as one governed by contract. Id.
128. 494 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
129. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Credit Card Issuer's Liability, Under State
Laws, for Wrongful Billing, Cancellation, Dishonor, or Disclosure, 53 A.L.R.4TH 231
(1987). The only case, other than Gray v. American Express, cited in the annotation supporting a breach of contract claim against an issuer canceling a credit
card is one in which the only issue was whether the applicable statute of limitations was one for contract or one for tort. The appellate court's conclusion that
the action sounded in contract for statute of limitation purposes did not reach
the merits of the contract claim. 53 A.L.R.4TH § 4(a) at 251 (1987).
130. Feder, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 42. The credit card was subject to a $1,600.00
credit limit, and at the time of the alleged conversion, the credit card number
appeared on a restricted card list because the charges against the account exceeded the limit. Id.
131. Id. Prima facie tort is a catch-all category of intentional tort. It requires the plaintiff to show intentional injury to a legally recognized interest
without legally sufficient justification. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870
(1979).
132. Feder, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
133. Id. at 42-43.
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most any time, between the end of one transaction and the
commencement of the next. This result would create enormous
problems for users, who would be subject to ever changing use
and access requirements. As is discussed below, the law developed in the area of employment relations offers a more useful
model.
3.

Employment Law

A conclusion that the contractual relationship between network service provider and network user is a series of one shot
contracts is not terribly useful. It transforms the formal legal enforcement submodel into the disconnection enforcement model
by creating an ongoing right to terminate the relationship. If the
formal legal enforcement model is to have utility, it must be based
on legal relations that continue past the end of a particular network transaction.
Contract formation, interpretation and modification questions present in the network services context are remarkably like
those that arise in the employment context. Employers typically
define terms of employment unilaterally and publish those to employees in employee handbooks and personnel policies. Sometimes the terms involve employee benefit plans, implicating
ERISA, and sometimes they involve promotional policies, disciplinary procedures and the grounds for which an employer may
3
terminate employment.1

4

Traditionally, such informal statements of employment policy and the terms of the employment contract were entirely unenforceable under the employment at will rule and a set of
associated assumptions and virtually irrebuttable presumptions.1 3 5 Thus, no contract could be based on the unilaterally
published terms because they were not promissory in expression,
because there was no mutuality of contract or because the employee gave insufficient consideration merely by performing his
134. See HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 8.11, at 174 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL] (discussing termination and complaint policies).
135. See id. § 1.6, at 13. The employment-at-will rule dictates that a "general hiring is to be construed as a hiring at will under which either party may at
any time determine the employment." Id.; see also Bernard v. IMI Systems, Inc.,
618 A.2d 338, 342 (N.J. 1993) (discussing history of employment at will rule); see
generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGIS. HIST. 118 (1976) (tracing employment at will rule back to its origin in
English law and noting that rule was adopted in United States without "serious
consideration of its theoretical support or potential impact").
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or her ordinary duties.' 3 6
During the last twenty years, however, courts in virtually all
the states have abandoned these specialized rules and have
brought informal employment law into the mainstream of contract law.' 3 7 Now, unilaterally published employment terms may
be sufficiently promissory to be enforced, employees can accept
the published terms by performing their regular duties, and consideration is present when employees pass up other job opportu1 38
nities or do not exercise their power to quit.
Some states have gone further and are willing to enforce employer policies merely because they are issued in a relatively formal way, without individualized inquiry into employee knowledge
or detrimental reliance. 139 Similarly, ERISA takes the contract
formation questions out of the equation by making employee
benefit promises enforceable merely because they are contained
in a plan.' 40 Under both ERISA and priorjudicial decisions, what
is important is the publication of the terms of the relationship by
one party-the employer..Any terms published with the requisite
formality become enforceable, regardless of whether the party
seeking to enforce them (the employees and benefit plan participants) provides consideration in the traditional sense, and even
regardless of whether he can show actual knowledge of the
terms. 141
136. EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 134, § 1.6, at 15 ("[T]here were two
interrelated theories for preventing recovery for wrongful dismissal on a contract theory: the presumption of an employment at will, and the stringent application of an independent consideration requirement.").
137. See id. § 1.9, at 18-20.
138. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880
(Mich. 1980) (noting that legitimate employee expectations of employment tenure based on employer's policy statements and handbooks are enforceable in
breach of contract action).
139. See, e.g., Bullock v. Automobile Club, 444 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Mich.
1989) (handbook promises enforceable without showing of employee knowledge of particulars); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1265
(N.J. 1985) (handbook enumeration of reasons for dismissal could permitjury to
infer promise to dismiss only for those reasons).
140. Section 1132 of title 29 of the United States Code provides that a civil
action may be brought in state or federal court "to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, (or] to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan
.... " 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988). Section 1102(a)(l) provides that every
plan shall "be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument." Id.
§ 1102(a)(l) (1988). The courts have interpreted these provisions to create an
entitlement to benefits provided for in the plan documents without any inquiry
into the presence of consideration under common-law contract principles. See
generally HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CLAIMS LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 3.13-3.18 (1990) (discussing role of consideration in plan modification).
141. In Woolley, a "Personnel Policy Manual" was found to constitute an
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Once employer statements of employment policy and terms
of employment became legally enforceable, questions arise about
how to interpret and modify a contract. There is a split of authority as to whether employers get substantial deference in interpreting the terms of the employment contracts they established or
whether judges and juries apply de novo interpretations. 42 However, under ERISA, the Supreme Court has decided that the
terms of employee benefit plans must be interpreted de novo by
courts unless the plans delegate discretion to plan administrators
43
to interpret them.1
Modification questions involve whether the employer reserved the power to modify the contract. This question is implicated whenever an employer changes a provision of an employee
handbook or whenever employers change employee benefits,
quite often by reducing or eliminating retiree health care benefits.
Obviously, if an employer expressly reserves the power to modify,
such a reservation is given affect.
More often, however, the dispute resolution tribunal must
decide whether there has been an implied reservation. This issue
frequently requires reference to actual practice. Conduct under a
contract indicates intent, and it also may defeat employee arguments of reasonable detrimental reliance. If an employer regularly has changed the terms of an employment contract or benefit
plan unilaterally, with no protest from employees, it is implausible for an employee to argue that he reasonably relied on the absence of an expressed power to modify.
All of these issues and the ways in which they have been reoffer. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1266. The offer was construed as "seek[ing] the formation of a unilateral contract-the employees' bargained-for action needed to
make the offer binding being their continued work when they have no obligation
to continue." Id. at 1267. The court rejected the argument that the job security
provision was unenforceable because the balance of the agreement was indefinite and that, as a result, the issue of whether "good cause" for termination was
operating without standard. Id. at 1269. "[T]he fact that in some cases the [termination] 'for cause' provision [in the job security provision] may be difficult to
interpret and enforce should not deprive the employees in other cases from taking advantage of it." Id.
142. See, e.g., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 134, § 4.49, at 375 (discussing who decides what constitutes just cause in context of terminations). Compare
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (allowing
factfinder to decide whether reason offered by employer for dismissal constitutes just cause) with Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 643 P.2d 1276 (Or.
1982) (allowing employer to decide factual question of what conduct occurred as
long as decision is in good faith and not arbitrary and capricious).
143. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (refusing
to adopt arbitrary and capricious standard for review on wholesale basis).
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solved in the employment context involve mainstream contract
law and analysis. They form the appropriate starting point for
evaluating contract law as a means of enforcing rights in the electronic network context. The statement of terms for network access seems remarkably like an employee handbook or a set of
personnel policies, with respect to its unilateral character, with
respect to the likelihood it would be changed from time to time
and with respect to the way in which the recipient "accepts" it.
To the extent that differences between network and employment environments are appropriate, they must be justified based
on identifiable differences between the two contexts. Obviously,
one difference is that ERISA exists in the employment context
and not in the network context. Of course, it may be desirable to
develop an ERISA analogue in the network context, but such a
statute does not exist now. Nevertheless, ERISA covers only a
part of the employment relationship; the rest of it-at least the
contract issues-are purely matters of common law.
The imbalance in bargaining power between employees and
employers is replicated in many cases in the electronic network
context. Many employees, like many network customers, have to
take it or leave it with respect to the terms offered by large employers and network service providers. On the other hand, in
both the network and the employment context, there are times
when the customer, or employee, has at least as much economic
power as the supplier, or employer.
Employees are thought to lack bargaining power vis-a-vis employers because the transaction costs are higher for employees
looking for other jobs than they are for employers looking for
new employees. In network markets, where the transaction costs
for a network user to switch networks are similarly high relative to
the costs of the network, the employment law model may be appropriate. Unlike the advertisement cases and the credit card
cases, the employment law model recognizes that it may be appropriate to interpret unilateral specifications as binding once the
weaker party "accepts" by entering into the relationship and giving up options.
VI.

ABSENCE OF PRIVITY IN INTERMEDIATE NETWORKS

All of the legal analysis in the Article so far addresses the
legal relation between an information producer or consumer and
the originating or terminating network. It does not address the
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rulemaking and enforcement activities with respect to intermediate networks. This is an important omission.
The architecture of the future is an internetworking architecture in which information is handled through a number of different networks all linked together through protocols functionally
equivalent to the Internet's Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocols. 44 The architecture is
somewhat like the architecture involved in placing a telephone
call from an originating Local Exchange Carrier (LEC), such as
Bell of Pennsylvania, through at least one interexchange carrier
such as MCI, to another LEG such as Pacific Bell. 14 5
The originating and terminating networks have a relationship
with, respectively, the sender and receiver of traffic, and that relationship will be governed by terms established under one of the
mechanisms discussed so far in the Article. The networks that
connect the originating and receiving networks do not necessarily
have any legal relationship with the originator or the ultimate
consumer. An example from the telephone context is illustrative.
When I place a call through Bell of Pennsylvania, I have a contractual relation with Bell of Pennsylvania, but I do not have a
direct contractual relationship with Pacific Bell, and may not have
a contractual relationship with MCI. You receive the call through
California Bell, with which you have a contractual relationship,
but you do not have a contractual relationship with Bell of Pennsylvania, and are even less likely than I to have a contractual relationship with MCI because your long distance carrier may be
AT&T.
So it is with digital networks. The originating and terminating LANs are likely to have contractual relationships with their
immediate participants. The intermediate networks may have
contractual arrangements with all networks that connect to them,
144. TCP/IP refers to the two protocols that make up Internet services that
include electronic mail, file transfer and remote log in (Telnet) on an internet
connecting computer systems supplied by different vendors. The IP part permits connected computers or computer networks to establish connectionless
packet delivery service. 1 DouctAs E. COMER, INTERNETWORKING WITH TCP/IP
5 (1991). TCP/IP supplies reliable stream transfer service, imposing an errordetection-and-correction connection on top of the IP service. TCP/IP, popularized by ARPAnet and Internet, is used much more widely now. It is a major
feature of many local area networks, providing them with the capability to connect with other local area networks and computers using different operating systems, regardless of proprietary features.
145. The analogy is imperfect because the telephone service providers are
common carriers regulated under Title 2 of the Federal Communications Act.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-226 (1990).
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like New England Area Regional Network (NEARnet), 14 6 but they
are unlikely to have contractual relationships with the originator
and consumer. The service providers with some of the greatest
practical rulemaking and enforcement power lack privity with the
47
actual consumers of their services.'
The legal problem is worse than this. As the networking
technology improves, the routing between originating and terminating networks becomes increasingly dynamic. Dynamic routing
means that the route that any particular message--or even any
particular packet-takes is determined by traffic loads and delays
on alternative links at any point and time. Routing software
selects the optimal route, which may involve one combination of
intermediate networks one time and an entirely different combination for another message. If legal rights and duties are to be
defined only by contract, there is a sort of combinatorial explosion with respect to contract transactions. In any event, the transaction costs rise rapidly.
This reality militates in favor of at least a standard set of
terms for network service providers handling intermediate traffic.
But who specifies these terms and who enforces compliance with
the standard terms? Who deprives an intermediate network of its
usual power to set whatever terms it wants for a particular
connection?
One answer may be that it does not matter. The market for
intermediate networking services may be such that one can survive as a provider of these services only by offering essentially
open terms resembling what traditional common carriage would
impose. Also, the possibility of discrimination may not matter because of the multiple alternative paths available. Thus, if a particular originating or terminating network is denied a connection to
an intermediate network, it simply can find another connection.
But legal doctrine that could force connections may be necessary
146. NEARnet is a "regional" or "midlevel" network in the Internet. Such
a midlevel network connects the backbone NSFnet to individual nodes or local
area networks. In addition to serving as simple intermediaries for handling traffic, midlevel networks add value in the form of user support services and various
kinds of local connections. Increasingly, as federal support for the backbone
declines and commercial use of the Internet increases, midlevel networks connect directly to each other and to several different backbones. For example,
most midlevel networks now connect to the noncommercial NSFnet backbone,
run by ANS, to the ANS commercial backbone and to CIX (Commercial Internet
Exchange).
147. See Meza v. General Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir.
1990) ("Privity is merely another way of saying that there is sufficient identity
between parties prior and subsequent to suits for res judicata to apply.").
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if a group of services controls a bottleneck or concertedly or in
parallel denies access.
One way that an originator or consumer could enforce duties
of network intermediaries is through third party contract beneficiary theory.1 4 8 This would be effective only if the intermediary
had entered into a contract with someone-presumably other intermediaries or an originating or terminating network. Under
certain circumstances, the contract to which the intermediary was
a party could be interpreted as conferring benefits on the originator or consumer.1 49 If prerequisite conditions are met, "a promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended
beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary
150
may enforce the duty."'
It is not necessary that the beneficiary be identifiable at the
time the contract is made,' 5' but only intended beneficiaries may
enforce the contractual duties. 5 2 An intended beneficiary need
not be identified expressly on the contract. It is enough that
recognizing a right in the beneficiary furthers the intentions of
the parties and "the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
153
performance."
Under these criteria, whether the originator or consumer of
information has standing would depend on an interpretation of
the contract entered into by the network intermediary. In a suit
by the originator or consumer against the intermediary, the inter148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981) (recognizing
creation of duty to intended beneficiary).
149. Only one of the illustrations to § 304 is particularly analogous to the
network intermediary situation. It hypothesizes that a common carrier contracts
for liability insurance covering claims for bodily injury arising out of the common carrier's operations. If such liability insurance is required as a condition of
the common carrier's license, it is plausible that the contracted insurance was
intended to benefit the persons injured by the common carrier, and therefore,
such an injured person may maintain a direct action against the insurance company. Id. § 304 illus. 9 (1981).
150. Id. § 304. The drafters of the Restatement explained this proposition
as deriving from "the basic principle that the parties to a contract have the
power, if they so intend, to create a right in a third person." Id. § 304 cmt. b.
151. Id. § 308 (discussing identification of beneficiaries).
152. Id. § 315 (noting that incidental beneficiary acquires no right against
the promisor by virtue of contract).
153. Id. § 302 (distinguishing intended from incidental beneficiaries). For
example, an industrial concern contracting to use a municipality sewage system
to prevent harm to downstream landowners creates rights in the downstream
landowners as intended beneficiaries. Id. § 302 illus. 10. Additionally, an employee is an intended beneficiary of a collective bargaining agreement entered
into between the employee's union and the employer. Id. § 302 illus. 14.
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mediary would argue that the contract was only meant to create
rights in the intermediary and the other party to the contract.
The only benefit meant to be conferred was one on the connecting network. The intermediary defendant would argue that retail
customers are not intended beneficiaries of all contracts between
the retailer and the retailer suppliers, and that the network intermediary contract is most analogous to such a retailer/wholesaler
contract.
Conversely, the plaintiff would argue that the only reason for
including terms relating to nondiscrimination against traffic
would be to assure persons at the end points of a virtual connection of a clear channel for their traffic as they define it. 1 4
Third party beneficiary theory can also apply when the intermediary's contract is with the government, as might be the case
with certain Internet or NREN intermediaries. Section 313 of the
Restatement says that the general third party beneficiary rules apply except that "a promisor who contracts with a government or
governmental agency to do an act for or render a service to the
public is not subject to contractual liability to a member of the
public for consequential damages resulting from performance or
failure to perform unless" the contract explicitly provides for
such liability or a direct action against the promisor is consistent
with the purpose of the contract and public policy.' 5 5 A strongly

analogous illustration shows that an entity contracting to carry
mail over a certain route does not, by virtue of that contract, become liable to a member of the public injured by the entity's failure to perform its contract. 156

While it is conceivable that a user of network services could
enforce access rights against intermediaries based on third party
beneficiary theories, such a result is speculative, to say the least.
Because the Restatement puts so much weight on policy considerations, contract-based theories do not make results much more
predictable than tort or statutory based theories, although they
do permit effect to be given to explicit manifestations of intention
either affirmatively or negatively.
VII.

MODES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

When developing the basic models, earlier parts of this Arti154. Because that is the only conceivable purpose of including such terms,
they would argue, the tests of Restatement § 302 are met.
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313.

156. Id. § 313 illus. 1.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss2/2

40

Perritt: Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network Communities

19931

DISPUTE RESOLUTION

389

cle distinguished between rulemaking and rule enforcement. The
earlier discussion also supports the proposition that some enforcement role for legal institutions is likely in most real world
electronic networks. That discussion did not, however, consider
the actual procedures through which rules would be made or enforced. This part probes rulemaking procedures and enforcement procedures. Enforcement in formal legal systems involves
some kind of adjudication, and the term adjudication is used in
57
this section to emphasize the procedural nature of the inquiry.
Although rulemaking and adjudication are conceptually distinct modes of decisionmaking they can be combined in practice.
An adjudicator may make new rules just as a traditional common
law court makes new rules to fit cases of first impression. It is
possible to have a system in which there is only adjudication. A
claimant need not make a claim of right in the sense that the
claimant identifies some pre-existing rule under which his case
falls. In such a system the adjudicator would have very broad discretion to decide whether a particular transaction is "fair." For
example, a dispute arises over acceptable use of internetworking
facilities, and a committee of members of the Internet meet to
decide how the dispute should be resolved fairly, without reference to any pre-existing rules, because there are none.
Alternatively, a system can be envisioned in which the rules
are flexible and easily changed and in which no one is given adjudicatory power and thus the rules have only some kind of moral
force. This happens in the authoritarian rulemaking model with
disconnection enforcement, and in the democratic rulemaking

model with social enforcement.15 8 If a new case arises that seems
anomalous under the pre-existing rules, the rulemaker simply
makes a new rule dealing with the case as the rulemaker thinks
appropriate.
Moreover, there is a trade off between specificity of rules and
discretion of adjudicator. When rules are very general, they require much interpretation when they are applied and the adjudicator has, correspondingly, greater discretion. Conversely, when

the rules are very specific and narrowly drawn, the adjudicator has
157. In the context of administrative law, the term adjudication indicates a
proceeding involving adversary parties appearing before a tribunal to present
evidence and/or make legal arguments; this tribunal has the authority to decide
the dispute. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.16 (2d ed.
1984) (distinguishing adjudication from rulemaking).
158. For a discussion of the authoritarian and the democratic rulemaking
models, see supra notes 10-43.
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less discretion, frequently being empowered to do no more than
resolve factual disputes.
Electronic network dispute resolution thus can span the
range from a complete absence of rules with a neutral party empowered to resolve disputes on some kind of general fairness basis to a system in which the rules are highly specific and a
factfinder is empowered to apply them in a final and binding way.
Obviously, in some configurations, the specificity of rules and
character of adjudication are independent variables. A network
could have a set of very specific rules with all disputes being resolved in the regular law courts. On the other hand, it is hard to
envision a system with no rules producing justiciable causes of
action to be heard in courts.
A.

Rulemaking

If network access is to be a matter of enforcing expectations
induced by terms defined unilaterally in advance, as under all of
the contract theories considered above, there must be some
means of deciding what is entitled to the status of an advance
"term." This implicates "rules of recognition" or "secondary
rules" in the terminology of some scholars of jurisprudence. 59
In contract law, this is the contract interpretation question introduced previously. There are a number of ways to identify legally
significant rules or terms. Publication in the Federal Register is
the way selected for rules by Federal Administrative Agencies. In
an electronic network context, there could be some electronic
bulletin board on which the terms of engagement would be
posted.
It is not difficult to envision how rulemaking can work in an
eletronic environment.' 60 All that is necessary for electronic
rulemaking is to designate a particular area such as a bulletin
159. Put simply, a rule of recognition is a "duty-imposing law" by which all
other rules of a society are tested. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM:

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF A LEGAL SYSTEM

199 (2d ed.

1980). The term "rule of recognition" is associated with philosopher and legal
theorist H.L.A. Hart. See generally HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw

97-107 (1961).
160. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Electronic Agency and the TraditionalParadigms of Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 84 (1991) (describing electronic model of agency rulemaking).
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board 16 1 or a conference 62 on which proposed and final rules
will be posted and, if an interactive rulemaking process is envisioned, a mailbox for the receipt of EMail messages, 63 commenting on proposed rules.
Rules would be modified by the expedient of changing the
posting. Actual and constructive notice to users would be facilitated by having a single place for posting. Bureaucratic costs and
delay would be reduced by using electronic methods.
B. Adjudication
Deciding that network users have rights not to be excluded
from networks in some circumstances, such as when network service providers grant those rights, does not entirely resolve the enforcement question. The rights must be applied to concrete
factual situations and disputes over whether rights have been violated must be resolved. The two phrases in the preceding sentence are just two different ways of describing the adjudication
process.
The need for adjudication does not imply, however, that all
disputes and all applications of rights must turn into lawsuits in
federal or state court. There are a variety of nonjudicial dispute
resolution techniques that are worthy of consideration. One obvious possibility is arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or a similar group promoting
arbitration. Another possibility is resolution by some private process established by the network services provider or by the participants in the network. A mechanism set up unilaterally by the
network services provider would look rather like employer-sponsored procedures for resolving employment claims, or the procedures that employee benefit plans are required to set up for
161. An electronic bulletin board system consists of computer hardware,
software and communications connections that permit users to post messages so
that all other users can see them. For a further discussion of bulletin boards and
related systems, see Ethan Katsh, Law in A Digital World: Computer Networks and
Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REV. 403 (1993).
162. An electronic conference is similar to an electronic bulletin board except that the posted messages typically are organized by subject matter, facilitating interactive exchange on the same subject.
163. EMail stands for electronic mail. An electronic mail system, consisting
of computer hardware, software and communications connections, permits individual users to send messages to other predefined addressees. Messages may be
sent to one or multiple addressees. The addressee need not be connected to the
system at the time a message is sent in order to receive it. Rather, messages are
stored in "mailboxes" until an addressee is ready to read her accumulated
messages.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 2

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 349

handling benefit claims under ERISA.164 Collective dispute resolution processes would have the same status as private association
dispute resolution tribunals, prominently involved in professional
sports leagues and churches, and discussed in section III(B)(2) of
this Article.
The legal position of arbitration is representative of the legal
position of most kinds of contractual dispute resolution procedures. Arbitration produces a final and binding decision by a
neutral. 6 5 An arbitration award is entitled to res judicata effect
in any subsequent judicial proceeding as long as the process that
produced the award had the essential attributes of adjudication. 166 A party refusing to arbitrate has committed a breach of
contract. 16 7 A party seeking to avoid arbitration by suing directly
in court faces dismissal of the judicial action on the grounds that,
by agreeing to arbitrate, the party waived the right to sue immediately. 168 Moreover, the Federal Arbitration Act and the Uniform
Arbitration Act, adopted in about half the states, make arbitration
awards enforceable, require legal action sidestepping arbitration
to be stayed and strictly limit the grounds for which arbitration
awards may be overturned by courts. 16 9 Indeed, international arbitration awards may be more predictably enforceable across international boundaries than judgments of courts in individual
70
countries. '
A contractual dispute resolution process that produces a
nonfinal or a nonbinding decision has less effect in subsequent or
collateral judicial proceedings.' 7' Nevertheless, the results of the
process should be admissible in evidence and may significantly
164. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1990) (setting forth process due to beneficiaries whose claims have been denied).
165. See generally U.S. Arbitration Act (USAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 (1990);
Uniform Arbitration Act § 1, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985).

166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 84 (1982) ("[A] valid and
final award by arbitration has the same effects under the rules of resjudicata...
as a judgment of the court.").
167. U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.

§ 2 (1990); Uniform Arbitration Act § 1,

7 U.L.A. 5 (1985).
168. See, e.g., Sanders v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 819 F.2d
1151, 1157 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs estopped from litigating neg-

ligent termination claims because they had opportunity to raise claims during

arbitration).
169. See, e.g., Uniform Arbitration Act § 2, 7 U.L.A. 60-68 (discussing pro-

ceedings to compel or stay arbitration).
170. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (explaining motive

for enforcement of international arbitration awards under USAA).
171. Such a dispute resolution does not have the res judicata effect on a
judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982).
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affect the judicial outcome, 172 and a failure to participate in the
process may be an independent breach of contract. The existence
of the process should be a waiver of the right to sue immediately
for breach of the underlying agreement.
Whether a particular process has the status of arbitration depends on how neutral the decisionmaker is. Parties wanting to
ensure the status of arbitration should select decisionmakers
through the AAA or a similar organization. The creators of the
dispute resolution process have considerable discretion with respect to procedural details. 7 3 Similarly, the failure of the decisionmaker to give reasons or to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and the absence of a formal record do not
impair the legal quality of the ultimate decision. 74 On the other
hand, if the procedure gets too far away from an adversarial presentation of material facts and does not provide an opportunity to
make legal arguments, the essential characteristics of adjudication
may not be present and the finality of the award may be questionable under the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments as well as the status
175
of the process as arbitration under the Arbitration Acts.
C.

Factors in Designing Dispute Resolution Systems

Given the wide range of dispute resolution possibilities, it is
appropriate to consider why a network would choose one or another form. Expertise is one possibility, including greater familiarity with the norms and the patterns of conduct in that particular
network or kind of network.
In an electronic conference during the Fall of 1992, some
people suggested that disputes among participants in electronic
76
networks could be subjected to electronic dispute resolution.
172. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974)
(holding that nonbinding arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence in Title
VII case; weight attached to evidence to be decided by trial court).
173. It is quite clear, for example, that the unavailability of discovery does
not impair the finality or enforceability of the resulting decision.
174. See Gonce v. Veterans Admin., 872 F.2d 995, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(holding arbitrator under no duty to set forth findings of fact to support award);
Lisbon Sch. Comm. v. Lisbon Ed. Ass'n., 438 A.2d 239 (Me. 1981) (holding
arbitrators have no duty to give reasons for decision).
175. See Racine v. State Dept. of Trans. and Pub. Facilities, 663 P.2d 555,
557 (Alaska 1983) (noting that arbitration process does not permit dispute resolution involving substantial rights "without regard to constitutional
safeguards.").
176. This conference involved both law professors and practicing attorneys. For a discussion of the lessons the participants learned, see Katsh, supra
note 161.
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Some people envision this as involving a kind of polling to determine the appropriate resolution of a particular dispute.

77

It is

interesting to speculate on the pros and cons of a system that uses
a plebiscite for adjudication.
Adjudication is no more difficult to implement electronically
than rulemaking. There needs to be a particular kind of message
and a specified manner of "serving" it178 and a way for the pleading, discovery and trial functions to be performed. Pleading is
easy because it simply envisions the exchange of electronic documents setting out the facts and legal theories supporting a claim
and the response. Discovery, at least in the form of interrogatories, similarly is simple to accomplish through an electronic
network.
The trial function envisions an adversarial presentation
before a neutral decisionmaker who has some formal way of signifying his decision. Modern litigation is becoming more focused
on discrete issues decided largely on paper submissions, with the
single-event, face-to-face trial playing less of a role.' 79 This trend
and single issue decisions based on written submissions can be
accommodated nicely in an electronic network environment.
The face-to-face portions are more difficult. As multimedia
becomes common, recorded audio and video testimony within the
adjudication database is conceivable. Until then, the most that
can be done in a purely networked environment is interactive argument and presentation through a "chat" feature. It is far from
clear, however, that this mode of electronic dispute resolution
would be efficient because people type more slowly than they talk.
VIII.

HYPOTHETICAL

The following hypothetical makes more concrete the concepts discussed in this Article.
VillaNet posts its terms of service in a special notice area
available to anyone, nonsubscribers as well as subscribers. A person wishing to subscribe must read the notice area and then can
177. The electronic conference was established by Trotter Hardy, Associate
Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and

Mary.

178. Service of process conceptually signifies only predefined formalities so

that the person served knows that it is legal process being delivered to him or
her and that someone testifies that delivery has been made.
179. See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 725, 73135 (1989) (noting benefits and detriments of live trial as opposed to paper trial).
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subscribe on line by responding to prompts that signify knowledge and acceptance of the terms of service as well as providing
for payment. The terms of service explicitly reserve the power to
modify those terms by giving notice to subscribers and the subscribers explicitly signify their acceptance of the reserved power
to modify when they subscribe. As modifications to the terms of
service are adopted, a notice is automatically given to all subscribers on log in.' 80 When comments on proposed rules are solicited,
they are solicited in the same way that notices of final modifications to rules are given.
This describes the rulemaking process; it does not determine
who has authority to make rules. Rules could be made unilaterally by the "owner" of VillaNet or they could be made through
some democratic voting process implemented on the network. If
a democratic process were provided for, some means of narrowing the issues and framing the questions for a vote would be necessary, a kind of electronic Robert's Rules of Order. Anyone
claiming that a subscriber has violated the terms of service, or
that service is not being provided according to the terms of service, would file an electronic complaint after which the matter
would be handled through the electronic adjudicatory process described in section VII of this Article.
IX.

HARM TO THIRD PARTIES

A network services provider cannot eliminate the possibility
of tort liability by the content of any notice. While the principles
discussed in earlier sections of this Article permit the publication
of a notice to result in a contract waiving certain rights, this result
can apply at most to persons having actual notice and acting in
response to the notice or with knowledge of it. Frequently, the
injured party with a potential tort claim is someone who has no
immediate dealings with the network. For example, the person
defamed by a message handled on a network or whose copyright
is infringed by a file maintained on a network is someone who
does not use the network and may not even know if its existence
until after the injury has occurred.
Nevertheless, notices by network service providers can narrow the range of possible tort liability. Network operators can
180. It makes no difference whether subscribers obtain access to VillaNet
through the Internet, through a Public Data Network (PDN) like Tymnet or
Sprintnet or by dial up telephone connection. -In each case they must log in,
giving their user names and passwords.
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tailor operations so as to conform to the common carrier model.
Or, notice can defeat expectations of privacy, eliminating network
users as potential plaintiffs in invasion of privacy actions. A notice can make it clear that the network reserves the power to refuse traffic, that in the sole opinion of the provider, might expose
it to criminal or tort liability. These opposite approaches avoid
the conundrum in which a services provider is obligated to handle
traffic that exposes it to criminal or tort liability. A notice can
offer the possibility of alternative dispute resolution of third party
tort claims as discussed in section IX(B). Finally, a notice can
make it clear that the services provider does not vouch for the
accuracy of any traffic handled on the network, thus reducing the
likelihood that the services provider would be found to be a republisher of defamatory information.
A.

Proposed Statute

Existing common law concepts may not be adequate to protect network services providers from tort liability and also to ensure the fulfillment of reasonable expectations by network
customers.
In this event, the proposed statute provides a choice. A network services provider can obtain a limited immunity or safe harbor from tort liability by posting terms of service on the
electronic bulletin board. No administrative agency or court
would have authority to scrutinize the content of the terms of service in advance, and any claim for failure to afford the published
terms would be through civil actions in the regular courts.
The proposed system would be different from a traditional
tariff system in three important ways. First of all, posting would
be voluntary. Second, there would be no authority to suspend
rates or other terms as unreasonable. Third, there would be no
exclusivity of published terms; the purpose of the posting is not
to eliminate discrimination, it is to channel expectations and enforce their realization.
The proposed statute would appear as follows:
§ 1 Terms of Service & Liability
Any network services provider who posts "Terms of
Service" on the electronic bulletin board provided for
that purpose by the Federal Communications Commission and provides service according to the posted Terms
of Service, shall not be liable to any person for injury
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caused by messages or files handled by that provider according to the posted Terms of Service, unless in violation of an injunction obtained by the person alleging
harm.
§ 2 Enforcement of Terms of Service
Suits for enforcement of Terms of Service may be
brought in any United States District Court or in any
State court with jurisdiction of the parties.
The proposed statute would not face serious First Amendment challenges because any obligation to provide service and
handle content is voluntary. The terms of service are those determined unilaterally by the person subject to the duty. Moreover,
filing the electronic notice and therefore coming within the statute's enforcement provisions also is voluntary. The statute actually is little more than a contract enforcement statute and
contractual obligations do not infringe First Amendment free
speech rights.
The statute would reduce uncertainty with respect to enforcement of access rights. While a number of common law theories exist for enforcing such rights, there also are uncertainties
with respect to contract formation and contract modification, as
explained in sections IV & V of this Article. By reducing these
uncertainties, the proposed statute is like section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which made collective
bargaining agreements enforceable under federal law. 8 ' Such
agreements already were enforceable to a significant degree
under state law, but there were common law doctrines that cre82
ated uncertainty.
With respect to tort and criminal liability, the statute can be
understood as codifying certain parts of the common law, as expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, immunizing common
carriers, except for one important difference. The common law
immunity for common carriers presumably depended upon an externally imposed obligation to serve all who apply. The proposed
statute extends this immunity to obligations derived from
contract.
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
182. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957)
(LMRA § 301 overrides common law rule preventing enforcement of executory
agreements to arbitrate).
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Alternative Dispute Resolutionfor Tort Claims

As an alternative, or in addition, to the proposed statute, a
network service provider worried about tort liability could design
and implement an alternative dispute resolution system. The
rulemaking component would elaborate on the rulemaking activities suggested in section VII(A) of this Article. It would involve
the development and publication of a clear set of ground rules as
to what content is permissible and not. In some network environments, where there is a sense of community and shared cultural
values, collaboration in developing the rules, and knowledge of
them will be enough by itself: separate enforcement activities will
be necessary in only the smallest fraction of instances. The
rulemaking part of this approach should explicitly address the
major categories of information that might produce legal liability,
including defamatory communications, communications infringing intellectual property rights, communications invading privacy,
communications involving material restricted from export and
communications violating anti-obscenity statutes.
The second component of a dispute resolution system, the
notice component, is a procedure by which someone alleging injury from communications handled on the network can give the
network services provider notice of that belief. A useful analogy
is the system for complaint and notice to employers of sexual harassment in the workplace.' 8 3 The notice and complaint procedure should be published to anyone who might be harmed by
information handled on the network-within reason. In any
event, anyone making a complaint should be informed of the
procedure.
In addition to being a procedural prerequisite to recovery,
notice of a complaint also modifies the application of existing
legal analysis. For example, once the network service provider
has notice of the defamatory content of a message, the provider
has a duty to remove the message from circulation.1 4 The continued intentional circulation of defamatory material will cause
85
the provider to be liable as a republisher.
This "with knowledge" element of tort analysis creates the
possibility that providers will overreact and remove material that
183. See EMPLOYEE DisMISSAL, supra note 134, § 2.5, at 101-07 (explaining
sexual harassment complaint procedure).
184. See Perritt, supra note 1, at 106-08 (discussing application of common
law rules of libel to network users and operators).
185. Id.
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does not create legal harm but that is deemed unpopular or offen-

sive by the majority, or indeed by an outspoken minority. One
notice of complaint, no matter how unfounded, will undoubtedly

give rise to the desire to protect against a tort claim by removing
the material.
The adjudicatory process must take this substantive aspect of
notice into account. One possibility is to provide for the temporary removal of the material pending an accelerated review by an
independent arbitrator. This approach parallels steps an employer should take after receiving a complaint about sexual harassment. Of course, a network provider would be free to leave

the material in place, if, in its opinion, the material does not give
rise to legally recognized harms.
The third element is an adjudicatory mechanism. This
should be implicated whenever a complaint is received through
the procedure established in the second element. The easiest
kind of adjudicatory arrangement is arbitration, which can be effected by a one sentence term saying simply: "The network services provider agrees to final and binding arbitration of any claim
of harm resulting from traffic along the network, under the rules
of the American Arbitration Association." The American Arbitration Association handles the rest.
The advantage of such a procedure is that it channels disputes in a way that leads to appropriate results, while avoiding an
overly intrusive and defensive censorship policy. It is highly likely
that an arbitration award would be respected by a court hearing
any subsequent tort claim, although the arbitration award would
be entitled to res judicata effect only if the complaining party also
agreed to arbitration.
In summary, there are four things a network intermediary
worried about tort liability can do:
1. Do not worry. The likelihood of liability under common
law rules is relatively low for network intermediaries who truly are
not in the content censoring business and for whom it truly is
impracticable to police content.
2. Tailor operations so as to conform to the common law
common carrier model. When such a network intermediary is
sued for tort, the intermediary can defend on the grounds that it
is a common law common carrier.
3. Seek legislation resembling the Proposed Statute.
4. Design and implement a dispute resolution system with
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three components: a rulemaking component, a notice component
and an adjudicatory component.
X.

CONCLUSION

As wide area electronic networks become more important in
society, producers and consumers of network services need to
have reliable expectations about the status of their commitments.
Commitments come in two forms: representations made by the
service provider as to the terms of service and practical arrangements made by consumers of network services to use the service,
frequently in reliance on the representations.
Efficiency is served by minimizing the role of the law. Nevertheless, entirely informal governance of the terms of service is
likely to work only in networks having the attributes of real social
communities. As the geographic and subject matter extent of
electronic networks becomes greater, these attributes are not
likely to exist. The need for the law to be involved is commensurately greater.
Most matters involving network participants, including both
suppliers and consumers of network services can be handled appropriately through contract law models. Contract law can accommodate both an authoritarian model, in which a single
provider of network services makes the rules, retains the power to
modify them and to terminate services, but the rules as they exist
from time to time are enforceable as contract terms by consumers
of the services. The advertising and credit card cases yield a result that is inconsistent with formal legal enforcement under the
authoritarian rulemaking model. Rather, those cases are more
compatible with a disconnection enforcement model. Instead of
these sets of authority for the legal enforcement model, this Article suggests an analogy to the employment relationship. The
contract model also can accommodate a more democratic model
in which all of the participants of a network, including both producers and consumers, make rules through whatever procedures
and mechanisms they agree to and the rules are enforceable as
rules of a private association.
Electronic methods can be used both for rulemaking and rule
enforcement, and rule enforcement can be accomplished through
arbitration as well as through the regular courts.
There are limitations on the contract approach, however. It
does not fully deal with potential tort liability to third parties.
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Tort claims can, however, be channeled in two ways. First,
tort immunity basically resembling what is available under the
common law can be preserved for network service providers publishing terms of service that handle traffic without discrimination
or content control. This requires a statute, a preliminary draft of
which is included in this Article. Alternatively, tort claims can be
channeled into an alternative dispute resolution system.
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